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Abstract
We present a tractable framework for the analysis of the relationship between contract incom-
pleteness, technological complementarities and the division of labor. In the model economy, a
￿rm decides the division of labor and contracts with its worker-suppliers on a subset of activities
they have to perform. Worker-suppliers choose their investment levels in the remaining activities
anticipating the ex post bargaining equilibrium. We show that greater contract incompleteness
reduces both the division of labor and the equilibrium level of productivity given the division of
labor. The impact of contract incompleteness is greater when the tasks performed by di⁄erent
workers are more complementary. We also discuss the e⁄ect of imperfect credit markets on the
division of labor and productivity, and study the choice between the employment relationship
versus an organizational form relying on outside contracting. Finally, we derive the implications
of our framework for productivity di⁄erences and comparative advantage across countries.
￿We thank Gene Grossman, Oliver Hart and Rani Spiegler, as well as participants in the Canadian Institute for
Advanced Research conference and seminar participants at Harvard, MIT, Tel Aviv and Universitat Pompeu Fabra,
for useful comments. We also thank Davin Chor, Alexandre Debs and Ran Melamed for excellent research assistance.
Acemoglu and Helpman thank the National Science Foundation for ￿nancial support. Much of Helpman￿ s work for
this paper was done when he was Sackler Visiting Professor at Tel Aviv University.1 Introduction
This paper develops a simple framework for the analysis of the relationship between contracting
and the division of labor. While a major strand of the economics literature, following Adam Smith
(1776) and Allyn Young (1928), emphasizes the importance of the extent of the market as the
major constraint on the division of labor, the recent literature has recognized the role of the costs
of designing and managing organizations consisting of many individuals each performing di⁄erent
tasks. Naturally, greater division of labor will necessitate both more complicated (contractual or
implicit) relationships and greater coordination between the ￿rm and its workers. It is thus di¢ cult
to imagine a society reaching the division of labor we observe today without the important advances
in accounting and use of information within organizations.1 This perspective has been emphasized,
for example, by Becker and Murphy (1992), who suggest that the division of labor is not limited
by the extent of the market, but by ￿coordination costs￿inside the ￿rm. Nevertheless, they do not
provide a microeconomic model of how and why these costs vary across societies and industries.
This is one of our objectives in this paper.
Our approach builds on Grossman and Hart￿ s (1986) and Hart and Moore￿ s (1990) seminal
papers, which develop an incomplete-contracting model of the internal organization of the ￿rm.
The key insight is to think of the ownership structure and the size of the ￿rm as chosen partly
in order to encourage investments by managers, suppliers and workers. Hart and Moore show
how this approach can be used to determine the boundaries of the ￿rm, but do not investigate
how the degree of contract incompleteness and the nature of the production technology a⁄ect
the division of labor. We extend Hart and Moore￿ s framework by considering an environment
with partially incomplete contracts and varying degrees of technological complementarities (i.e.,
complementarities between di⁄erent production tasks). Using this framework, we investigate how
the degree of contracting incompleteness (for example, determined by the contracting institutions
of the society) and technological complementarity impact on the equilibrium degree of division of
labor.
In our baseline model, a ￿rm decides the range of tasks that will be performed and the division
of labor, recognizing that a greater division leads to greater productivity. However, together with
the greater division of labor comes the need to contract with multiple workers (suppliers) that are
undertaking relationship-speci￿c investments.2 A fraction of the activities that workers have to
undertake are contractible, while the rest, as in the work by Grossman-Hart-Moore, are nonveri-
￿able and noncontractible. The fraction of contractible activities is our measure of the quality of
1See Pollard (1965) on the advances in accounting and other information-collection technologies during the 19th
century, Michaels (2004) and Yates (1989) on the role of clerks and advances in information processing during the
early 20th century in the reorganization of production, and Chandler (1977) on the rise of the modern corporation and
the relationship between this process and increasing informational demands of organizations. A di⁄erent perspective,
which we do not pursue in this paper, would build on Marglin (1974) and emphasize the bene￿ts of division of labor
in monitoring workers.
2Throughout, we focus on the relationship between a ￿rm and its ￿worker-suppliers,￿and simplify the terminology
by referring to these as workers. Since our model is su¢ ciently abstract, it can also be applied to the relationship
between a downstream ￿rm and multiple upstream suppliers.
1contracting institutions.3 While workers are contractually obliged to perform their duties in the
contractible activities, they are free to choose their investments and can withhold their services in
noncontractible activities, and this leads to an ex post multilateral bargaining problem. As in Hart
and Moore (1990), we use the Shapley value to determine the division of ex post surplus between
the ￿rm and the workers. We derive an explicit solution for the Shapley value of the ￿rm and the
workers, which enables us to provide a closed-form characterization of the equilibrium.
Workers￿expected surplus in this bargaining process determines their willingness to invest in the
noncontractible activities. Since they are not the full residual claimants of the productivity gains
derived from their investments, they tend to underinvest. Our ￿rst major result is that greater
contracting incompleteness reduces worker investments, and via this channel, limits the pro￿tability
and the equilibrium extent of the division of labor. Secondly, a greater degree of technological com-
plementarity limits the division of labor, since it further discourages investments. The reason for
this is interesting; although greater technological complementarity increases equilibrium payments
to each worker, it also makes their payments less sensitive to their noncontractible investments,
and reduces investments. These lower investments make a greater division of labor less pro￿table.
We also show that better contracting institutions are more important for ￿rms with technologies
featuring greater complementarity. These results also have natural implications for productivity.
For example, better contracting institutions lead to greater productivity both because the equilib-
rium division of labor is higher and because, conditional on the division of labor, workers invest
more and are more productive.
We also characterize the equilibrium when workers cannot make ex ante transfers to the ￿rm
to compensate for the ex post rents they receive in the bargaining process. While the major
comparative static results are the same as in the case with ex ante transfers, the relationship
between the equilibrium division of labor and productivity is more complex. In fact, equilibrium
productivity can now be higher than both in the case with incomplete contracts and ex ante
transfers and in the case with complete contracts. The reason is that, in the absence of ex ante
transfers, the ￿rm uses investments in contractible tasks as an instrument for extracting surplus
from the workers, potentially inducing overinvestment. Even though overinvestment is ine¢ cient,
it increases the observed level of productivity. Consequently, without ex ante transfers, greater
division of labor may be associated with lower productivity.
We also use this framework to discuss when the employment relationship, where various produc-
tion tasks are performed by employees of the ￿rm rather than by outside contractors, may emerge as
an equilibrium outcome. The key observation is that agents have greater bargaining power in their
relationship with the ￿rm when they are outside contractors, which is similar to non-integrated
suppliers having greater bargaining power in Grossman-Hart-Moore￿ s theory of the ￿rm. We show
3Maskin and Tirole (1999) question whether the presence of nonveri￿able actions and unforeseen contingencies
necessarily lead to incomplete contracts. Their argument is not central to our analysis because it assumes the presence
of ￿strong￿contacting institutions (which, for example, allow contracts to specify sophisticated mechanisms), while in
our model a fraction of activities may be noncontractible not because of ￿technological￿reasons but because of weak
contracting institutions. In fact, we interpret the fraction of noncontractible activities as a measure of the quality of
contracting institutions.
2that with ex ante transfers, the equilibrium always involves outside contractors, because this orga-
nizational form increases agents￿bargaining power and investment.4 The employment relationship
can arise as an equilibrium arrangement in the absence of ex ante transfers, however. The reason
is that agents may obtain too much rents as outside contractors, and the employment relationship
enables the ￿rm to reduce these rents. Interestingly, in this case, the employment relationship also
makes the division of labor more pro￿table, and leads to greater division of labor. Our framework
therefore leads to a theory of employment relationship complementary to that by Marglin (1974).
While in his theory, given the employment relationship, the division of labor is used to extract more
rents from workers, in ours, the employment relationship itself enables the ￿rm to obtain greater
rents and thus encourages a greater division of labor.5
A succinct way of expressing the results in our paper is that in the presence of noncontractibil-
ities and ex post bargaining, the (equilibrium) pro￿t function of a ￿rm is modi￿ed to
AZF (N) ￿ C (N)
where N represents the division of labor,C (N) its cost and A is a measure of aggregate demand
or the scale of the market. Naturally, F (N) is an increasing function. With complete contracts,
Z is a constant, but more generally, it depends on the degree of contract incompleteness and
technological complementarity. Key comparative static results follow from the response of Z to
parameter changes. For example, Z is decreasing in the degree of contract incompleteness and
technological complementarity.
This simple form of the equilibrium pro￿t function enables us to embed our model in a general
equilibrium framework. The interesting result here is that, because of the equilibrium resource con-
straint, an improvement in contracting institutions does not increase the division of labor in all sec-
tors (￿rms). Instead, the division of labor increases in sectors that are more ￿contract-dependent￿
and declines in others. In our model, sectors with greater technological complementarity are more
contract-dependent and experience an increase in the division of labor in general equilibrium, while
those with a high degree of substitutability experience a decline in the division of labor. In the
context of an open economy, the same interactions lead to endogenous comparative advantage as
a function of contracting institutions. In particular, among countries with identical technologies,
those with better contracting institutions will specialize in sectors with greater complementarities
among inputs.
While our main focus is on the division of labor, the results in this paper are also relevant for
the literature on cross-country di⁄erences in (total factor) productivity. Although there is a broad
4This result is partly due to the fact that we assume away relationship-speci￿c investment by the ￿rm after its
technology choice.
5Our framework can also be used to discuss the trade-o⁄ between vertical integration and non-integration with
workers interpreted as suppliers. In this context, Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Legros and Newman (2000) show
how ine¢ cient vertical integration can arise in the presence of imperfect credit markets. The interesting result in our
framework, di⁄erent from these papers, is that the employment relationship (or vertical integration) can be ￿e¢ cient￿
because of its implications for the division of labor.
3consensus that di⁄erences in total factor productivity (￿e¢ ciency￿ ) are a major part of the large
cross country di⁄erences in living standards (e.g., Klenow and Rodriguez, 1997, Hall and Jones,
1999, Caselli, 2004), there is no agreement on the sources of these productivity di⁄erences. Our
results suggest that di⁄erences in contracting institutions can be an important source of productivity
di⁄erences. Societies facing the same technological possibilities, but functioning under di⁄erent
contracting institutions, will choose technologies corresponding to di⁄erent degrees of division of
labor and will naturally have di⁄erent levels of productivity. Furthermore, because of the di⁄erences
in workers￿investment levels, these societies will also experience di⁄erent levels of productivity even
conditional on the division of labor. A detailed investigation of whether this could be an important
source of (total factor) productivity di⁄erences across countries is an interesting area for future
research.
In addition to the papers mentioned above, our work relates to two large literatures. The ￿rst
investigates the relationship between the division of labor and the extent of the market. It includes
the work by Yang and Borland (1991), as well as the product-variety models of endogenous growth,
such as Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), that can be interpreted as linking the
level of (equilibrium) demand in the economy to the division of labor.
The second literature derives implications for the division of labor from the theory of the ￿rm.
Important work here includes the Grossman-Hart-Moore papers discussed above as well as their
predecessors, Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1975, 1985), which emphasize
incomplete contracts and hold-up problems. The two papers by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b) are
most closely related to our work. Stole and Zwiebel consider a relationship between a ￿rm and
a number of workers where wages are determined by ex post bargaining according to the Shapley
value. They show how the ￿rm may overemploy in order to reduce the bargaining power of the
workers and discuss the implications of this framework for a number of organizational design issues.6
Stole and Zwiebel￿ s framework does not incorporate relationship-speci￿c investments, which is at
the center of our approach, and they do not discuss the division of labor or the e⁄ects of contract
incompleteness and complementarities on the equilibrium division of labor.
Another important strand of the literature stems from the seminal work by Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1991, 1994), which emphasizes issues of multi-tasking, job design and complementarity of
tasks as important determinants of the internal organization of the ￿rm. These considerations nat-
urally lead to a theory of the division of labor, where the ￿rm may want to separate substitutable
tasks in order to prevent severe multitask distortions. Yet another approach, perhaps closer to the
spirit of the contribution by Becker and Murphy (1992), explicitly models the costs of communi-
cation or information processing within the ￿rm (e.g., Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, Geanakoplos and
Milgrom, 1991, Radner 1992, 1993, Radner and Van Zandt, 1992, Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994,
and Garicano, 2000). Another strand of the literature, e.g., Calvo and Wellisz (1978) and Qian
(1994), links the size of the ￿rm to other informational problems, such as monitoring or selection.
6Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993) develop a related model to study the e⁄ects of improvements in information
technology on the number of suppliers that ￿rms choose to contract with.
4Finally, a number of recent papers, most notably Levchenko (2003), Costinot (2004), Nunn (2004)
and Antr￿s (2005), apply the insights of these literatures to generate endogenous comparative ad-
vantage from di⁄erences in contracting institutions. Among these papers, Costinot (2004) is most
closely related since he also focuses on the division of labor (though using a more reduced-form
approach).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic partial equilibrium
framework and characterizes the equilibrium with complete contracts. Section 3 characterizes the
equilibrium with incomplete contracts and contains the main comparative static results. Section 4
investigates how the results change when there are no ex ante transfers. Section 5 uses our frame-
work to study the choice between employment relationship and outside contracting. Section 6
embeds the partial equilibrium model in a general equilibrium framework and discusses how di⁄er-
ences in contracting institutions generate endogenous comparative advantage. Section 7 concludes,
while Appendix A contains the main proofs.
2 Model
In the next four sections, we present our model of the ￿rm and derive the main partial equilibrium
results, and later turn to general equilibrium analysis.
2.1 Technology
Consider a ￿rm, facing a demand curve for its product of the form q = Ap￿1=(1￿￿), where q denotes
quantity and p denotes the price, and ￿ 2 (0;1). A > 0 corresponds to the level of aggregate
demand in the economy and is taken as given by the ￿rm. This form of demand can be derived
from a constant elasticity of substitution preference structure for the consumers over many products
(see Section 6). It implies that the ￿rm in question generates a revenue of
R(q) = A1￿￿q￿ (1)
from producing a quantity q.
The ￿rm decides the technology of production which speci￿es a continuum range of tasks [0;N]
that will be performed, and the number of worker-suppliers that will perform these tasks, M. For
now, we do not distinguish whether these worker-suppliers are employees of the ￿rm or outside
contractors, and simply refer to them as workers (see, however, Section 5). Each worker will
perform " = N=M tasks, and we denote the services of tasks performed by worker j by X (j) for



















, 0 < ￿ < 1; ￿ > 0: (2)
A number of features of this production function are worth noting. First, since ￿ > 0, the elasticity
5of substitution between tasks, 1=(1 ￿ ￿), is always greater than one and determines the degree
of complementarity of the technology. Second, we follow Benassy (1998) in introducing the term
N￿+1￿1=￿, which allows us to disentangle the elasticity of substitution between tasks from the
elasticity of output with respect to the level of technology. To see this, suppose that X (j) = X
for all j. In this case, when technology is N, q = N￿+1X; so greater N translates into greater
productivity, and the parameter ￿ determines the relationship between N and productivity.7
In the text, we simplify the analysis further by considering the case in which M ! 1, and work














where the only ￿technology￿choice of the ￿rm is N.8 In Appendix B, we show that with complete
contracts M ! 1 in equilibrium, as long as there are ￿diseconomies of scope￿in assigning tasks
to workers, and we also provide conditions under which M ! 1 in equilibrium with incomplete
contracts. To simplify the discussion further, it is useful to suppose, from now on, that there
is a continuum of workers and that every task is performed by a separate worker. Under these
circumstances N stands for the measure of tasks as well as the measure of workers, and we refer to
N as the division of labor of the technology.9
Each worker assigned to a task needs to undertake relationship-speci￿c investments in a unit
measure of (symmetric) activities, each entailing a marginal cost cx. The services of the task in
question is then a Cobb-Douglas aggregate,






where x(i;j) denotes the level of investment in activity i performed by the worker. We adopt this
formulation to allow for a tractable parameterization of contract incompleteness, whereby a subset
of the investments necessary for production will be nonveri￿able and thus noncontractible. We also
assume that the cost of investments is non-pecuniary (e.g., in terms of ￿e⁄ort￿ , see equation (38)
in Section 6).
Finally, we denote the costs of division of labor by C (N), which could include potential (ex-
ogenous) coordination costs, costs of investment in technology, and upfront payments to cover the
outside options of the workers (when these are positive, see Section 6). We assume
7In contrast, with the standard speci￿cation of the CES production function, without the term N
￿+1￿1=￿ in front
(i.e., ￿ = 1=￿￿1), total output would be q = N
1=￿X, and these two elasticities are governed by the same parameter,
￿. Note also that in this formulation ￿ > 0 is important, since, otherwise, X and N would be perfect substitutes and
the ￿rm would set N = 0.
8Equation (3) is obtained as the limit of equation (2) when M ! 1. With a slight abuse of notation, we use j to
index workers in both the discrete and continuum cases.
9In other words, we suppose that the measure of workers performing the tasks in any interval [a;b] is b ￿ a. Note
also that, alternatively, we could have started with the production function (3) and the assumption that every task
is performed by a separate worker.
6Assumption 1
(i) For all N > 0, C (N) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable, with C0 (N) > 0 and C00 (N) ￿ 0.
(ii) For all N > 0, NC00 (N)=C0 (N) > [￿ (￿ + 1) ￿ 1]=(1 ￿ ￿).
The ￿rst part of this assumption is standard. The second part is necessary for second-order condi-
tions and to ensure interior solutions.
2.2 Payo⁄s
The ￿rm and the workers maximize expected returns.10 Suppose that the payment to worker
j consists of two parts: an ex ante payment, ￿ (j), and a payment after the x(i;j)s have been
delivered, s(j). Then, the payo⁄ to worker j is
￿x (j) = E
￿






where E denotes the expectations operator, which applies if there is uncertainty regarding the ex
post payment, s(j), which will be the case in the bargaining game. As stated above, we assume
that if a worker does not participate in the relationship with the ￿rm, then she has an outside

















[￿ (j) + s(j)]dj ￿ C (N)
#
;
which follows by substituting (3) and (4) into (1), and by subtracting the payments to workers and
the costs of division of labor.
2.3 Division of Labor with Complete Contracts
As a benchmark, consider the case of complete-contracts (the ￿￿rst best￿from the viewpoint of
the ￿rm), which corresponds to the case in which the ￿rm has full control over all investments
and pays each worker her outside option. In analogy to our treatment of the division of labor
with incomplete contracts below, consider a game form where the ￿rm chooses a technology with
division of labor N and makes a contract o⁄er, fx(i;j)gi2[0;1];j2[0;N] ;fs(j);￿ (j)gj2[0;N], to a set
of potential workers. If a worker accepts this contract, she is obliged to supply fx(i;j)gi2[0;1] as
stipulated in her contract. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this game with complete contracts
10We use risk neutrality only in the calculation of Shapley values to express the payo⁄ of a player as the expected
(average) value of his or her marginal contributions to all possible coalition structures.

















[￿ (j) + s(j)]dj ￿ C (N)
subject to
s(j) + ￿ (j) ￿ cx
Z 1
0
x(i;j)di ￿ 0 for all j 2 [0;N]:
Since the ￿rm has no reason to provide rents to the workers in this case, the constraints bind, and





















Put di⁄erently, the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts equal revenue minus the cost of investments of workers and the
cost of division of labor. Moreover, since this is a convex problem in the investment levels x(i;j)
and these investments are all equally costly, the ￿rm will choose the same investment level x for all
activities in all tasks and we can simplify the program to
max
N;x
A1￿￿N￿(￿+1)x￿ ￿ cxNx ￿ C (N): (5)
The ￿rst-order conditions of this problem are:11
￿ (1 + ￿)A1￿￿x￿N￿(￿+1)￿1 ￿ cxx ￿ C0 (N) = 0;
￿A1￿￿x￿￿1N￿(￿+1) ￿ cxN = 0;









Equations (6) and (7) can be solved recursively. Given Assumption 1, equation (6) yields a unique
solution for N￿, which, together with (7), yields a unique solution for x￿.
It is also useful to derive the productivity implications of the equilibrium with complete con-
tracts. When all the investment levels are identical and equal to x, output equals q = N￿+1x.
Since N workers are taking part in the production process, a natural de￿nition of productivity is
11Appendix A shows that the second-order conditions are satis￿ed under Assumption 1.
8output divided by N, i.e., P = N￿x. In the case of complete contracts this productivity level is
P￿ = (N￿)
￿ x￿: (8)
We will compare this productivity level to the level of productivity with incomplete contracts.12
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion and highlights the e⁄ects of some key
parameters on the division of labor, the investment level of workers and the associated productivity
levels (see Appendix A for details):
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then program (5) has a unique solution x￿ > 0
and N￿ > 0 characterized by (6) and (7), and an associated productivity level P￿ > 0 given by (8).



















In the case with complete contracts, consistent with Adam Smith￿ s emphasis, the size of the
market as parameterized by the demand level A a⁄ects the division of labor. Our model further
illustrates how a larger market size tends to be associated with greater investments by workers and
higher productivity.13
The other noteworthy implication of this proposition is that under complete contracts the
division of labor and productivity are independent of the elasticity of substitution between tasks,
1=(1 ￿ ￿). This will contrast with the equilibrium under incomplete contracts, where the elasticity
of substitution in￿ uences bargaining.
3 Division of Labor with Incomplete Contracts
3.1 Contractual Structure
We now consider a world with incomplete contracting, where each worker has control over the
investment levels in the various activities. In the text, we work with the production function (3),
which equates N with the division of labor. Appendix B shows that the ￿rm will indeed prefer to
12Notice that if x(i;j)s were adequately measured, the index of productivity would be P2 = N
￿. Our assumption
that the x(i;j)s correspond to ￿e⁄ort￿ naturally maps into an environment where these investments are not well
measured. Moreover, P appears to be much closer to what is in fact measured in practice, especially using aggregate
data, than P2.
Note also that P measures ￿price-adjusted￿ productivity, because it is in terms of output rather than revenue.




￿. Throughout, none of our conclusions depend on which of these two measures of productivity
are used.
13It is also straightforward to show that the division of labor, investment levels, and productivity all decline with
the marginal cost of investment, cx. In addition, as long as parameter values are such that N




￿) are increasing in the elasticity of output with respect to the division of labor, ￿. We do not emphasize
these comparative statics to save space.
9have the maximal division of labor given N as long as ￿ < ￿.14 Therefore, the results here may
be interpreted either as treating the production function (3) as a primitive, or as derived from the
production function (2) with these additional requirements satis￿ed.15
We model the imperfection of the contracting institutions by assuming that there exists ￿ 2
[0;1] such that, for every task j, investments in activities i 2 [0;￿] are observable and veri￿able.
Consequently, complete contracts can be written for the investment levels for activities i 2 [0;￿].
A contract stipulates investment levels x(i;j) for i ￿ ￿, which can be enforced by a court.16 For
the remaining 1 ￿ ￿ activities, ex ante contracts are not possible (either because the x(i;j)s are
nonveri￿able as in Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990, or because of the weakness of
contracting institutions in this society). Under these circumstances workers choose the investment
on noncontractible activities in anticipation of the ex post distribution of revenue between the
￿rm and the workers. We follow the incomplete contracts literature and assume that the ex post
distribution of revenue is governed by multilateral bargaining, and we adopt the Shapley value as
the solution concept for the multilateral bargaining game (more on this below). The threat point
of each worker in bargaining is not to provide the services for the noncontractible activities. To
start with, we assume that all parties have access to perfect credit markets, so ex ante transfers
from workers to the ￿rm, or the other way around, are possible.
The timing of events is as follows:
￿ The ￿rm adopts a technology (a division of labor) with N tasks, and o⁄ers a contract, denoted
by f[xc (i;j)]
￿
i=0 ;￿ (j)g, for every task j 2 [0;N], where the xc (i;j)s are the investment levels
in contractible activities i 2 [0;￿], which have to be performed by worker j, and ￿ (j) is an
upfront transfer to worker j.
￿ The ￿rm chooses N workers from a pool of applicants, one for each task j.
￿ Workers j 2 [0;N] simultaneously choose investment levels x(i;j) for all i 2 [0;1]. In the
contractible activities i 2 [0;￿] they invest x(i;j) = xc (i;j) for every j.
￿ The workers and the ￿rm bargain over the division of revenue.
￿ Output is produced and sold, and the revenue R(q) is distributed according to the bargaining
agreement.
We will characterize a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE for short) of this game, where
the bargaining outcomes in all subgames are determined by Shapley values.
14Provided that a mild regularity condition on diseconomies of scope is satis￿ed. This regularity condition will be
satis￿ed, for example, when there are no economies of scope, or when there are su¢ cient diseconomies of scope.
15In the general equilibrium version of the model developed in Section 6, the elasticity of substitution between
varieties of ￿nal goods will be 1=(1 ￿ ￿). The inequality ￿ < ￿ thus corresponds to the case in which tasks are more
substitutable than ￿nal goods.
16For example, the court can impose a large penalty if the employee does not deliver the contractually-speci￿ed
level of services. We do not introduce these penalties explicitly to simplify the exposition.
103.2 Equilibrium Formulation
The along-the-equilibrium path behavior in the SSPE can be represented as a tuple
n
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn;~ ￿
o
in which ~ N represents the division of labor, ~ xc is the investment in contractible activities, ~ xn is





the upfront payment is ￿ (j) = ~ ￿, and the investment levels are x(i;j) = ~ xc for
i 2 [0;￿] and x(i;j) = ~ xn for i 2 (￿;1]. For now, we assume that there are perfect credit markets
(i.e., workers have deep pockets), so ~ ￿ < 0 is possible.
The SSPE will be characterized by backward induction. Consider the last stage of the game. If
N is the level of technology, xc is investment in contractible activities and xn is investment in non-









This revenue is distributed among the workers and the ￿rm according to their Shapley values.
Importantly, at this point of the game N, xc and xn are given. We discuss the computation of
the Shapley values of this game in the next section and in Appendix A. For now, consider a situ-
ation in which all workers have invested xc in all contractible activities and xn in noncontractible
activities. Let sx (N;xc;xn) denote the Shapley value of a representative worker and sq (N;xc;xn)
denote the Shapley value of the ￿rm. These values naturally exhaust the entire revenue, i.e.,









Now move to one stage before the bargaining takes place. At that stage all workers know the
technology choice N and have to invest xc in the contractible activities, as they have committed to
do so in their contract. They are, however, free to choose the investment levels in the noncontractible
activities. To characterize the symmetric equilibrium, let ￿ sx [N;xc;xn (￿j);xn (j)] be the Shapley
value of worker j, when the technology choice is N, xc is the required investment in the contractible
activities, xn (￿j) is the investment level in the noncontractible activities by all the workers other
than j (these are all the same, since we are looking for a symmetric equilibrium), and xn (j) is
the investment level in every noncontractible activity by worker j.17 The function sx (N;xc;xn),
which was introduced above, is the along-the-equilibrium-path value of ￿ sx [N;xc;xn (￿j);xn (j)],
i.e., sx (N;xc;xn) = ￿ sx (N;xc;xn;xn). We develop an explicit formula for this function in the next
subsection.
At this stage of the game, worker j chooses xn (j) to maximize ￿ sx [N;xc;xn (￿j);xn (j)]. As
implied by the concept of equilibrium, the ￿rm expects the workers to choose their best response
investment levels in noncontractible activities:
xn 2 argmax
xn(j)
￿ sx [N;xc;xn;xn (j)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)cxxn (j): (9)
This is the workers￿￿incentive compatibility constraint,￿and also imposes the symmetry require-
17More generally, we would need to consider a distribution of investment levels, fxn (i;j)gi2[0;1] for worker j, where
some of the activities may receive more investment than others. It is straightforward to show that the best deviation
for a worker is to choose the same level of investment in all noncontractible activities, and to save on notation, we
restrict attention to such deviations.
11ment (in that xn is the best response to xn).18
Next move one step backward in the game tree, to the stage in which the ￿rm chooses N workers
from a pool of applicants. This pool is empty if workers expect to receive less than their outside
option. Therefore, for production to take place, the ￿nal good producer has to o⁄er a contract that
yields a net reward at least as large as the workers￿outside option, that is:
￿ sx (N;xc;xn;xn) + ￿ ￿ ￿cxxc + (1 ￿ ￿)cxxn for xn that satis￿es (9). (10)
This is the workers￿￿participation constraint￿ : given N and the contract (xc;￿), every worker
j 2 [0;N] expects her Shapley value plus the upfront payment to cover the cost of her investments
in contractible and noncontractible activities (when both she and other workers invest xn, as in (9),
in every noncontractible activity). If the ￿rm were to choose a division of labor N and a contract
(xc;￿) that did not satisfy this participation constraint, it would not be able to hire any workers.
The ￿rm chooses N and designs a contract (xc;￿) to maximize its pro￿ts. These pro￿ts consist
of its Shapley value minus the upfront payments (or plus the transfers from the workers) and minus
the cost of N. Consequently, it solves the following problem:
max
N;xc;xn;￿
sq (N;xc;xn) ￿ N￿ ￿ C (N) subject to (9) and (10). (11)
The presence of perfect credit markets implies that the participation constraint (10) can never
be slack (otherwise, the ￿rm would reduce ￿). We can now solve ￿ from this constraint, substitute




sq (N;xc;xn) + N [￿ sx (N;xc;xn;xn) ￿ ￿cxxc ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)cxxn] ￿ C (N) subject to (9). (12)
The SSPE tuple
n
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn
o
solves this problem, and the corresponding upfront payment, ~ ￿, sat-
is￿es
~ ￿ = ￿cx~ xc + (1 ￿ ￿)cx~ xn ￿ ￿ sx
￿
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn; ~ xn
￿
: (13)
With a slight abuse of terminology, we refer to
n




Before we provide a more detailed characterization of the equilibrium, we derive the Shapley values
in this game (see Shapley, 1953, or Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). Since we have a continuum of
players and the original Shapley value applies to games with a ￿nite number of players, we derive
our solution as follows (see the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix A for details). Divide the interval
18In general, (9) may have multiple ￿xed points, and there can be multiple equilibria given the choice of N and
xc by the ￿rm. Our production function (3) and the assumption that ￿ > 0 ensure uniqueness (see equation (18)
below).
12[0;N] into M equally spaced subintervals with all the tasks in each one of length N=M performed
by a single worker (as in the discussion of equation (2) above). Then solve the Shapley values of
the bargaining game between the M + 1 players; M workers and the ￿rm. The key insight that
simpli￿es the solution is that a coalition that does not include the ￿rm, which is the only agent
that can operate the technology, has a value of zero and a coalition that includes the ￿rm has a
value that equals the revenue from the ￿nal output it can produce. The solution that we use below
is the limit of the solution of this game with a ￿nite number of players when M ! 1 (see Aumann
and Shapley, 1974, and Stole and Zwiebel, 1996b, for a similar derivation of Shapley values in a
game with a continuum of players).
According to the Shapley value, in a bargaining game with a ￿nite number of players each
player￿ s payo⁄ is the average of her contribution to all coalitions that consist of players ordered
below her in all feasible permutations. More explicitly, in a game with M + 1 players, let g =
fg (0);g (1);:::;g (M)g be a permutation of 0;1;2;:::;M, where player 0 is the ￿rm and players
1;2;:::;M are the workers, and let z
j
g = fj0 j g (j) > g (j0)g be the set of players ordered below j in
the permutation g. We denote by G the set of feasible permutations and by v : G ! R the value of


















The following result is proved in Appendix A:
Lemma 1 Suppose that M ! 1, and worker j invests xn (j) in her noncontractible activities, all
the other workers invest xn (￿j) in their noncontractible activities, every worker invests xc in her
contractible activities, and the division of labor is N. Then the Shapley value of worker j is













A number of features of (14) are worth noting. First, if all workers invest equally in all the
noncontractible activities, xn (j) = xn (￿j) = xn, then
sx (N;xc;xn) = ￿ sx (N;xc;xn;xn) = (1 ￿ ￿)A1￿￿x￿￿
c x￿(1￿￿)
n N￿(￿+1)￿1: (16)
In this event, the joint Shapley value of the workers, Nsx (N;xc;xn), is the fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the




n N￿(￿+1)). It then follows that the ￿rm receives a fraction
￿ of the revenue, or
sq (N;xc;xn) = ￿A1￿￿x￿￿
c x￿(1￿￿)
n N￿(￿+1): (17)
13Second, the derived parameter ￿ = ￿=(￿ + ￿) represents the bargaining power of the ￿rm; it is
rising in ￿ and declining in ￿. That is, a higher elasticity of substitution between tasks increases
the competition between workers at the bargaining stage (since each worker is less essential for
production) and reduces their bargaining power.19 On the other hand, an increase in ￿ (an increase
in the price elasticity of demand for the ￿nal good) has the opposite e⁄ect.20
Finally, the parameter ￿ also determines the concavity of the Shapley value of a worker,
￿ sx [N;xc;xn (￿j);xn (j)], with respect to noncontractible activities xn (j). The intuition for this
is that in the limit as M ! 1, each worker has an in￿nitesimal e⁄ect on total output, so she
does not perceive the concavity in revenues coming from the elasticity of demand (related to ￿).
Instead, the perceived concavity for each worker simply depends on the substitution between her
task and the tasks performed by other workers, which is regulated by the parameter ￿. The more
substitutable are the tasks, the less concave is ￿ sx (￿) in each worker￿ s investment. The impact of ￿
on concavity will play an important role in the results below.
3.4 Equilibrium










￿(1￿￿) N￿(￿+1)￿1 ￿ cx (1 ￿ ￿)xn (j).
Relative to the producer￿ s ￿rst-best, characterized above, we see two di⁄erences. First, the term
(1 ￿ ￿) implies that the worker is not the full residual claimant of all the investments she undertakes,
so she will tend to underinvest. Second, as discussed above, multilateral bargaining distorts the
perceived concavity of the private return function.
The ￿rst-order condition for this optimization problem, evaluated at xn (j) = xn (￿j) = xn,
19To understand the e⁄ect of ￿ on ￿ more precisely, recall that the Shapley value of the worker is an average of her
contributions to coalitions of various sizes. The impact of ￿ on the marginal contribution of a worker depends on the
size of the coalition. Consider the marginal contribution of a worker to a coalition of n workers who cooperate with the
￿rm when the technology choice is N. We show in Appendix A that this marginal contribution equals (￿=￿)(n=N)
￿=￿






n is the total revenue of the ￿rm. This marginal contribution is increasing in
￿ for small coalitions, i.e., when n=N < exp(￿￿=￿), and decreasing in ￿ for large coalitions, i.e., n=N > exp(￿￿=￿).
Intuitively, with only a few other workers in the coalition, a technology that requires complementary inputs generates
smaller marginal revenues than one that requires inputs that are more substitutable. Conversely, with most workers
in the coalition, the marginal contribution of a new worker is highest when technology features relatively high
complementarity. Since the Shapley value equals a weighted average of these marginal contributions, with the weight
being larger for larger coalitions (because there are more permutations leading to large coalitions containing the ￿rm),
the impact of ￿ on the Shapley value is also a weighted average of the impact of ￿ on the marginal contributions of
a worker to coalitions of di⁄erent size and the negative impact of ￿ receives more weight, making the share of each
worker, (1 ￿ ￿)=N = ￿=(￿ + ￿)N, decreasing in ￿.
20The intuition behind the negative e⁄ect of ￿ on ￿ is similar. An increase in ￿ increases the price elasticity of
demand for the ￿rm and makes revenues less concave in output. This decreases the marginal contribution of a worker
to a coalition of relatively small size and increases her marginal contribution to a coalition of relatively large size. In
particular, this marginal contribution is decreasing in ￿ whenever n=N < exp(￿￿=￿), and increasing in ￿ whenever
n=N > exp(￿￿=￿). As before, the Shapley value assigns larger weights to coalitions of larger size, so that the positive
impact of ￿ dominates and 1 ￿ ￿ = ￿=(￿ + ￿) is increasing in ￿.
14yields a unique solution:







This choice of investment in noncontractible activities rises with the investment level in the con-
tractible activities, because di⁄erent activities performed by the worker are complements (i.e., the
marginal productivity of an activity rises with investments in other activities).21
Another important implication of equation (18) is that investments in noncontractible activities
are increasing in ￿. Mathematically, this simply follows from the fact that ￿(1 ￿ ￿) = ￿￿=(￿ + ￿)
is increasing in ￿. Economically, it is the outcome of two o⁄setting forces. As noted above, (1 ￿ ￿),
which enters the Shapley value of each worker, is decreasing in ￿. This implies that the level of
payments to workers is decreasing in ￿, because greater substitution between workers reduces their
bargaining power. However, the e⁄ect of ￿ on the concavity of ￿ sx (￿) makes xn increasing in ￿,
and this e⁄ect dominates the impact of ￿ through (1 ￿ ￿). In essence, though a greater ￿ reduces
the level of payments to workers, it also makes these payments more sensitive to their investments,
encouraging greater equilibrium investments.






c ￿ xn (N;xc)
1￿￿
i￿
N￿(￿+1) ￿ cxN￿xc ￿ cxN (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ xn (N;xc) ￿ C (N); (19)
where ￿ xn (N;xc) is de￿ned in (18). Substituting for ￿ xn (N;xc) and di⁄erentiating with respect to N
and xc,22 we obtain two ￿rst-order conditions, which can be manipulated to yield a unique solution ￿
~ N; ~ xc
￿











1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)

















The unique SSPE is then given by
n




￿(1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]







21 The e⁄ect of N on the level of xn is ambiguous, however. In particular, investment in noncontractible activities
declines with the division of labor when ￿ (￿ + 1) < 1 and rises with the division of labor in the opposite case.
Intuitively, an increase in N has opposite e⁄ects on the incentives to invest for workers. On the one hand, because
technology features a ￿love for variety,￿a higher measure of tasks increases the marginal product of noncontractible
investments. On the other hand, the bargaining share of a worker, (1 ￿ ￿)=N, is decreasing in N. When ￿ ! 0, the
￿rst e⁄ect disappears and an increase in N necessarily reduces the investment xn.
22We show in Appendix A that the second-order conditions of this problem are satis￿ed under Assumption 1.
15Comparing (7) to (21), we can see that for a given level of N, the implied level of investment
in contractible activities under incomplete contracts, ~ xc, is identical to the investment level with
complete contracts, x￿. This highlights that there is no distortion in the investments in contractible
activities except through the distortion in the division of labor. Next, comparing (6) to (20), we see
that ~ N and N￿ di⁄er only because of the two bracketed terms on the left-hand side of (20). These
represent the distortions created by bargaining between the ￿rm and its workers. Notice that as
￿ ! 1, both of these bracketed terms go to one, and we have
￿
~ N; ~ xc
￿
! (N￿;x￿). That is, as the
measure of noncontractible activities becomes close to zero, the incomplete contracts equilibrium ￿
~ N; ~ xc
￿
converges to the complete contracts equilibrium (N￿;x￿).23
To examine the e⁄ect of incomplete contracting on productivity, notice also that productivity
is now equal to:
~ P = ~ N￿~ x￿
c ~ x1￿￿
n : (23)
The next proposition summarizes the key features of the equilibrium and the main comparative
statics (proof in Appendix A):
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists a unique SSPE
n
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn
o
given by (20), (21) and (22), with ~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn > 0, and an associated productivity level ~ P > 0 given
by (23). Furthermore,
￿
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn; ~ P
￿
satis￿es










































We therefore ￿nd that workers always invest less in noncontractible activities than in contractible
activities, and that the division of labor, investment levels, and productivity are all increasing in the
size of the market, the fraction of contractible activities and the elasticity of substitution between
tasks.
23Interestingly, however, it can be veri￿ed that as ￿ ! 1, ~ xn 9 x
￿, because the e⁄ect of distortions on the
noncontractible activities does not disappear as ￿ ! 1.




￿(1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿ [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)]
< 1, (24)
where the inequality follows from ￿(1 ￿ ￿) = ￿￿=(￿ + ￿) < ￿ (recall (15)). Intuitively, the ￿rm is
the full residual claimant of the investments in contractible activities and dictates these investments
in the terms of the contract. In contrast, investments in noncontractible activities are decided by
the workers, and as highlighted by (16), they are not the full residual claimants of the revenues
generated by these investments.
The analysis of comparative statics is facilitated by the fact that, given the second-order con-
ditions (which are ensured by Assumption 1), any change in A, ￿ or ￿ that increases the left-hand
side of (20) will also increase ~ N. As in the case of complete contracts, we ￿nd that the left-hand
side of (20) is increasing in A, and thus the division of labor again rises with the size of the market.
Appendix A shows that the left-hand side of (20) is also increasing in ￿ and ￿, so that the division of
labor is greater when there is less contract incompleteness and less technological complementarity.
Both results are intuitive. Incomplete contracts imply that workers underinvest in noncontractible
activities. An increase in ￿ increases the degree of contractibility and thus the pro￿tability of
further investments in technology (division of labor). The positive e⁄ect of ￿ stems from the e⁄ect
of this parameter on the concavity of the Shapley value of workers, ￿ sx (￿), discussed above. Greater
￿ increases workers￿investments, making division of labor more pro￿table for the ￿rm.
The other comparative static results in Proposition 2 then follow from equations (21), (23),
and (24). In particular, from equation (23), equilibrium productivity is also increasing in the size
of the market, the degree of contractibility and the substitutability of tasks, because both the
division of labor and ￿ given the division of labor ￿ the levels of investment in contractible and
noncontractible activities are increasing in these variables.24
It is noteworthy that the e⁄ect of ￿ on productivity is of the opposite sign as its e⁄ect in
standard Dixit-Stiglitz formulations of technology that do not include the Benassy (1998) term.
In these formulations, the larger is the complementarity in production, the larger is the response
of productivity to an increase in the division of labor. Our speci￿cation of technology in (3)
neutralizes this e⁄ect and helps isolate a new channel by which technological complementarity
a⁄ects productivity.
Another result, which will play an important role in Section 6, is @2 ~ N=@￿@￿ < 0. It implies
that better contracting institutions have a greater e⁄ect on the division of labor when there are
greater technological complementarities. The intuition is that contract incompleteness has a more
detrimental e⁄ect on the division of labor when there is greater complementarity between tasks,
because the investment distortions are larger in this case.
Finally, it is useful, both to further illustrate the intuition for the results and for future reference,
24Also, as noted in footnote 13, the division of labor, investment levels, and productivity are decreasing with cx
and increasing in ￿ as long as N
￿ ￿ 1.
17to note that combining (18), (19), and the ￿rst-order condition with respect to xc, the pro￿t function
of the ￿rm can be expressed as (see Appendix A):
￿ = AZ (￿;￿)N
1+
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿ ￿ C (N); (25)
where
Z (￿;￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿￿




1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)







and as before, ￿ ￿ ￿=(￿ + ￿). Z (￿;￿) is thus a term that captures ￿distortions￿ arising from
incomplete contracting.
The comparative static results regarding the e⁄ect of ￿ and ￿ on the division of labor simply
follow from the fact that Z (￿;￿) is increasing in both variables. This (equilibrium) reduced-form
pro￿t function will become useful in our general equilibrium analysis. It also makes other potential
applications of this framework quite tractable.
The above analysis also enables us to derive a straightforward comparison of equilibria with
and without complete contracts. Recall that the incomplete contract equilibrium converges on the
complete contract equilibrium when ￿ ! 1. Together with Proposition 2, this implies
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let
n
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn
o
be the unique SSPE with
incomplete contracts and fN￿;x￿g be the equilibrium with complete contracts. Let ~ P and P￿ be
the productivity levels associated with each of these equilibria. Then
~ N < N￿, ~ xn < ~ xc ￿ x￿, and ~ P < P￿.
This proposition implies that, with incomplete contracts, the equilibrium division of labor is
always suboptimal.25 Furthermore, investments in both contractible and noncontractible activities
are also lower than those under complete contracts. As a result of these e⁄ects, the level of
productivity with incomplete contracts is also lower than that with complete contracts.
Before concluding this section, and in order to facilitate the transition to the analysis of imper-
fect credit markets, consider the implications of the equilibrium for the ex ante transfer ~ ￿. If ~ ￿ is
positive, the ￿rm has to make an upfront payment to every worker, and if it is negative, the ￿rm
ought to receive an upfront payment from every worker. We use (13) to calculate the size of this
transfer in the SSPE.
25It is useful to contrast this result with the overemployment result in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b). There are two
important di⁄erences between our model and theirs. First, in our model, there are investments in noncontractible
activities, which are absent in Stole and Zwiebel. Second, Stole and Zwiebel assume that if a worker is not in the
coalition in the bargaining game, then she receives no payment to compensate for her outside option. Since in our
model whether the worker provides the services in the noncontractible tasks is not veri￿able, whether or not she is
in the coalition cannot a⁄ect her wage except through bargaining, and consequently she will continue to receive the
payments for her contractible investments. The treatment of the outside option is essential for the overemployment
result in Stole and Zwiebel.
18First note that ￿ sx
￿
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn; ~ xn
￿





equilibrium revenue, i.e., every worker receives an ex post payment equal to the share (1 ￿ ￿)= ~ N
of the revenue (her Shapley value). Second note that (18) implies cxxn = ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ~ R= ~ N as a
result of the worker￿ s optimal choice of investment in noncontractible activities. Combining these
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When ￿ < 1￿￿, this transfer is negative (~ ￿ < 0) for all ￿ 2 [0;1] and workers make upfront payments
to the ￿rm to compensate for the ex post rents they earn in the bargaining game. However, when
￿ > 1￿￿, ~ ￿ is no longer necessarily negative. It can be shown that it will be negative if and only if
contracts are su¢ ciently incomplete, i.e., ￿ < (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)=(￿=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿ + ￿) + ￿￿). When
contracts are more complete than this, ~ ￿ ￿ 0. This result stems from the fact that investments in
contractible activities are chosen by the ￿rm and set at a level greater than what workers would
have chosen themselves. As a result sx (￿) ￿ ￿cxxn ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)cxxc can become negative, in which
case the ￿rm has to make an upfront payment in order to secure workers￿participation. This case
is more likely when a greater fraction of activities are contractible.
4 Imperfect Credit Markets
The above analysis presumed that workers and ￿rms had access to ex ante transfers. However, the
same weak contracting institutions that make certain activities performed by the worker-suppliers
noncontractible also create credit market frictions and other capital market imperfections, which
may prevent such transfers (or ￿bonding￿arrangements).
We now analyze the same model with severe credit market imperfections that make ex ante
transfers from workers to the producer of the ￿nal good impossible:26
Assumption 2 Ex ante transfers from workers to ￿rms are not possible, i.e., ~ ￿ ￿ 0:
This extreme form of credit market imperfections is useful to focus on the interaction between
incomplete contracts and imperfect credit markets. Since we assume that the costs of investments
xn and xc are non-pecuniary, credit market imperfections do not directly prevent or restrict these
investments. This assumption is therefore in line with our interpretation of the x(i;j)s as potentially
nonveri￿able ￿e⁄orts￿ .
Recall that at the end of the Section 3 we provided a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
~ ￿ < 0. If this condition is not satis￿ed, then workers are not required to make ex ante transfers.
Then, as long as the ￿rm has deep pockets, the equilibrium from the previous section prevails.27
We now proceed to analyze the equilibrium with binding credit constraints. This requires
26Given Assumption 3 below, whether or not the ￿rm has deep pockets is not relevant.
27And if the ￿rm cannot make ex ante transfers either, then the equilibrium characterized in this section applies.
19Assumption 3
￿ <
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1￿￿ ￿ (￿ + ￿) + ￿￿
:
Given Assumptions 1-3, we again look for the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium. The main
di⁄erence is that in terms of the optimization problem (11), we now impose the additional constraint
￿ ￿ 0, which is (only) binding under Assumption 3. Therefore, the participation constraint becomes
￿ sx (N;xc;xn;xn) ￿ ￿cxxc + (1 ￿ ￿)cxxn. The maximization problem of the ￿rm then becomes
max
N;xc;xn
sq (N;xc;xn) ￿ C (N)
subject to (9) and ￿ sx (N;xc;xn;xn) ￿ ￿cxxc + (1 ￿ ￿)cxxn:
The problem can be further simpli￿ed by noting that the participation constraints will always
be binding. To see this, note that sq (N;xc;xn) is strictly increasing in xc, so if the participation
constraint were slack, the ￿rm could increase xc and thus sq (N;xc;xn). Therefore, using (16),






n N￿(￿+1) ￿ C (N) subject to (27)
￿(1 ￿ ￿)A1￿￿x￿￿
c x￿(1￿￿)
n N￿(￿+1)￿1 = cxxn;
(1 ￿ ￿)A1￿￿x￿￿
c x￿(1￿￿)
n N￿(￿+1)￿1 = ￿cxxc + (1 ￿ ￿)cxxn:
The two constraints of this problem can be used to solve the investment levels in contractible and
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x ￿(1 ￿ ￿)A1￿￿N￿(￿+1)￿1
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￿￿￿#1=(1￿￿) ￿









1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
; (30)
where ￿ xc and ￿ xn are, respectively, the equilibrium investments in contractible and noncontractible
activities. Interestingly, this ratio does not depend on ￿ and approaches zero as ￿ ! 0. Intuitively,
as ￿ ! 0, there are only a few activities that the ￿rm can use to extract the surplus from the
workers, and there will be greater overinvestment in these activities.
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. (32)
Using this equation and the equations for the investment levels (28) and (29), the equilibrium














1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
￿￿
￿




Comparing these equations with (21) and (22) when ￿ N = ~ N, we note that Assumption 3 implies
￿ xc > ~ xc and ￿ xn > ~ xn. That ￿ xc > ~ xc in this case is again a consequence of the fact that the ￿rm now
extracts the surplus from the workers by forcing them to ￿overinvest￿in contractible activities.29
Naturally, however, the division of labor di⁄ers in the two equilibria, and this will further a⁄ect
the equilibrium investment levels.
Analogously to before, we de￿ne equilibrium productivity (now without ex ante transfers) as
￿ P = ￿ N￿￿ x￿
c ￿ x1￿￿
n : (35)
We have (proof in Appendix A):
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then there exists a unique SSPE without
ex ante transfers,
￿ ￿ N; ￿ xc; ￿ xn
￿
, given by (32), (33) and (34), with ￿ N; ￿ xc; ￿ xn > 0 and an associated
productivity level ￿ P > 0 given by (35). Furthermore,
￿ ￿ N; ￿ xc; ￿ xn; ￿ P
￿
satis￿es
































@ (￿ xn=￿ xc)
@￿
> 0;
28Assumption 1 again ensures that the second-order condition is satis￿ed.
29Moreover, it is no longer the case that as ￿ ! 1, ￿ xc ! x
￿
c, since the ￿rm will use the contractible activities to





As in the case of perfect capital markets, workers always invest less in noncontractible activities
than in contractible activities. The reason for this is two-fold. First, as was the case in Proposition
2 above, workers are not the full residual claimants of the increase in productivity generated by
their investments. Second, in the presence of credit constraints, contractible investments are an
instrument of surplus extraction by the ￿rm, which forces workers to overinvest in these activities.
The comparative statics in Proposition 4 related to the division of labor and to the choice of
noncontractible activities are identical to those derived in Proposition 2. In particular, we ￿nd that
the division of labor and the investment in noncontractible activities are increasing in the size of
the market, the quality of the contractual environment, and the elasticity of substitution between
tasks. Furthermore, a higher degree of contractibility and lower technological complementarities
also lead to a lower gap between the investment levels in contractible and noncontractible activities.
Moreover, better contracting institutions have a larger impact on the division of labor when there
is greater technological complementarity.
Notice, however, that contrary to Proposition 2, equilibrium investment levels in contractible
activities ￿ xc now need not be increasing in the quality of contracting institutions (or in the substi-
tutability of tasks). The reason for this is again the dual role played by contractible activities; in
addition to their productivity enhancing role, they are also instruments for surplus extraction by
the ￿rm. When the degree of contractibility is low, there are fewer activities in which the ￿rm can
extract surplus, so overinvestment in the remaining contractible activities may increase. Similarly,
when there is limited substitution between tasks, the share of revenue accruing to workers is higher
(recall that ￿ is increasing in ￿) and the incentive to set a relatively high xc is greater.
The potential for overinvestment also has implications for productivity. Although, as before,
productivity is increasing in the size of the market and the quality of the contracting institutions,
it is no longer monotonic in ￿. This is because, as noted in the previous paragraph, a higher ￿
reduces the share of revenue accruing to workers and thus the amount of surplus to be extracted
through the choice of ￿ xc. Other things equal, this lower incentive to overinvest in ￿ xc leads to a
reduction in productivity. The overall e⁄ect of ￿ on ￿ P is thus ambiguous. More interestingly, the
next proposition shows that productivity can be higher with imperfect credit markets than both
the case with incomplete contracts and perfect credit markets and the case with complete contracts
(proof in Appendix A):
Proposition 5 Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Let fN￿;x￿g be the solution to the complete
contracts problem, let
n
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn
o
be the unique SSPE with ex ante transfers, and let
￿ ￿ N; ￿ xc; ￿ xn
￿
be the unique SSPE without ex ante transfers. Let P￿, e P, and ￿ P be the productivity attained in
each of these three environments. Then
1 > ~ xn=~ xc > ￿ xn=￿ xc,
22and
N￿ > ~ N > ￿ N:
Suppose further that ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿. Then (i) ￿ P > ~ P for all ￿ 2 (0;1); and moreover (ii) if ￿ < 1 ￿ ￿,
there exists a unique ￿ 2 (0;1), such that ￿ < ￿ implies ￿ P < P￿ and ￿ > ￿ implies ￿ P > P￿.
Credit market problems therefore increase the spread between investments in noncontractible
and contractible activities and further reduce the division of labor. Intuitively, the ￿rm is now
obtaining part of the returns by ine¢ ciently extracting the surplus from the workers by means of
high levels of ￿ xc (and this is ine¢ cient, since there are diminishing returns to xc). This naturally
reduces the ￿productivity￿of further increases in the division of labor. Therefore, ~ N > ￿ N.
More interestingly, because ￿ xc may be higher than ~ xc, it now becomes possible that ￿ P > ~ P even
when ￿ N < ~ N. In other words, although credit constraints always depress the equilibrium division
of labor, measured productivity can be greater because of overinvestment in contractible activities.
In fact, the latter will necessarily be the case whenever the productivity gains from division of
labor, represented by ￿, are relatively low (￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿). Moreover, in this case, it is also possible
for productivity in the equilibrium with imperfect capital markets to exceed that of the ￿rst best
(i.e., ￿ P > P￿).30
5 The Employment Relationship Versus Outside Contracting
We now use our framework to discuss the choice between the employment relationship and an
organizational form relying on outside contracting. Our analysis so far assumed that the threat
point of each worker-supplier was not to deliver the noncontractible activities (which is equivalent to
not delivering the entire X (j) given the Cobb-Douglas structure in (4)). To endogenize the choice
of organizational form, we assume that the threat point of a particular agent is not to deliver a
fraction 1￿￿ of their X (j) and suppose that ￿ depends on whether she is an employee or an outside
contractor (in the spirit of Grossman and Hart, 1986, and Hart and Moore, 1990). Our analysis
above therefore corresponds to the case where ￿ = 0, but the results in this section (in particular,
Lemma 3) demonstrate that all the results so far hold for any value of ￿. In particular, in the case
of outside (arms-length) contracting, we assume that ￿ = ￿C 2 [0;1), and with an employment
relationship, ￿ = ￿E 2 (￿C;1) because the assets the agent uses are the property of the ￿rm.31
Moreover, to simplify the exposition we normalize ￿C = 0.
We also denote the choice of organizational form by O 2 fC;Eg, with C corresponding to
outside contracting and E corresponding to an employment relationship. We assume that the
30Conversely, when ￿ is relatively large (￿ > 1￿￿), the productivity loss associated with a limited division of labor
may dominate. In fact, when ￿ approaches its upper bound dictated by Assumption 1, it is necessarily the case that
P
￿ > ~ P > ￿ P. Notice also that in the absence of perfect credit markets, we have lim￿!1 ￿ P 6= P
￿, and this is what
makes ￿ P > P
￿ possible.
31To express these issues more formally, we could introduce X
e (j) as the e¢ ciency units of services provided
by worker j. Then, in the case of disagreement with an outside contractor, X
e (j) = ￿CX (j), and in the case of
disagreement when there is an employment relationship, X
e (j) = ￿EX (j).
23organizational form, O, is chosen concurrently with the choice of technology N.32 The rest of the
analysis continues to apply except that Lemma 1 needs to be modi￿ed to account for the fact that
the Shapley values in the ex post bargaining game now depend on the choice of O.
The following generalization of Lemma 1 is proved in Appendix A:
Lemma 2 Denote ￿O = ￿ and suppose that M ! 1, worker j invests xn (j) in her noncontractible
activities, all the other workers invest xn (￿j) in their noncontractible activities, every worker
invests xc in her contractible activities, and the division of labor is N. Then the Shapley value of
worker j is













(￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
: (36)
Imposing symmetry it is straightforward to show that ￿ again represents the fraction of revenue
accruing to the ￿rm in the bargaining, with (1 ￿ ￿)=N representing the fraction assigned to each
of the N workers.
Several features of this result are worth mentioning. Notice ￿rst that when ￿ = 0, the Shapley
values (and thus the SSPE of the game) are identical to those described in the previous sections.
When ￿ > 0, ￿ is greater than ￿=(￿ + ￿), so the ￿rm is now more powerful in the bargaining game
and obtains a larger fraction of the revenue. In the limit where ￿ goes to 1, the bargaining share
￿ also goes to 1, and the ￿rm has full bargaining power.
The following result provides a more complete characterization of the bargaining share ￿:
Lemma 3 For all ￿ 2 [0;1), ￿ is increasing in ￿ and ￿ and decreasing in ￿. Furthermore, ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
is increasing in ￿ and ￿(1 ￿ ￿)=￿￿ is nondecreasing in ￿.
Using this lemma, it can be shown that all the results regarding the comparative statics with
respect to ￿ and ￿ in the previous sections (Propositions 2 through 5) continue to hold. In par-
ticular, these results simply depended on the following properties: ￿ and ￿(1 ￿ ￿) are increasing
in ￿ and ￿(1 ￿ ￿)=￿￿ is nondecreasing in ￿. Lemma 3 implies that these properties hold for all
positive values of ￿. Consequently, conditional on the equilibrium choice of organizational form,
Proposition 2 through 5 continue to apply.
We next turn to discussing the equilibrium organizational form and its e⁄ect on the division
of labor. Consider ￿rst the model with perfect credit markets. Remember that in this case there
exists a unique SSPE
n
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn
o
given by (20), (21) and (22). We can now expand the de￿nition
of the SSPE to include the choice of organizational form, i.e.,
n
~ O; ~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn
o
, where ~ O 2 fC;Eg.
32For notational simplicity, we assume that the ￿rm chooses either to have an employment relationship for all of
the tasks or for none (given the symmetry of our setup this is without loss of generality).
24The analysis is simpli￿ed since the Envelope Theorem implies that the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts in (19) are
declining in ￿ and therefore in ￿ (to see this, recall that since xn < x￿
n, the level of pro￿ts is
increasing in xn, which is decreasing in ￿). This immediately implies that the ￿rm prefers ￿ = 0 to
any positive ￿ and establishes:
Proposition 6 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then in the unique SSPE with incomplete
contracts and no credit market imperfections, the equilibrium organizational form involves outside
contracting, i.e. ~ O = C.
In the absence of credit constraints, it is never optimal for the ￿rm to hire the agents as
employees. This stems from the fact that increasing the bargaining share of the ￿rm reduces
the incentives of workers to invest in the noncontractible activities, which in turn reduces the
marginal product of investing in contractible activities and in the division of labor.33 In other
words, because worker-suppliers are the only agents undertaking noncontractible investments, the
e¢ cient allocation of power entails giving them as much ex post bargaining power as possible. With
perfect capital markets this e¢ cient organizational form is attained with outside contracting, and
an employment relationship is never optimal.34
Let us next turn to the case with credit constraints. In this case, though ￿ = 0 maximizes sales
revenue, the ￿rm is constrained to obtain only a fraction ￿ of the revenue ex ante and may want to
increase this share. The employment relationship is then potentially useful as another instrument
for surplus extraction from the workers (in addition to xc). We ￿nd that in this case the possibility
to create an employment relationship may indeed enhance the division of labor.
To show this, we proceed in a manner analogous to that in the case with perfect credit markets.
From problem (31) and the Envelope Theorem, it is clear that the choice of organizational form O
is made to maximize ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿=(1￿￿). Because ￿ is monotonically increasing in ￿, a higher level of
￿ lowers this term whenever ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿. If this inequality holds for all ￿ 2 [0;1) (i.e., ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1),
then ￿ = 0 maximizes pro￿ts and ￿ O = C is the best strategy. Therefore, when ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿, the
equilibrium organizational form involves outside contracting.
More interesting results obtain when ￿ < 1 ￿ ￿ for some ￿ 2 [0;1) (i.e., ￿ + ￿ < 1). In this




, then the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts are maximized
when all agents are hired as employees. Under these circumstances the equilibrium organizational
form involves the employment relationship between the ￿rm and the workers. Furthermore, the
threshold ￿ ￿ is implicitly de￿ned by
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿+￿
















= 1 for ￿ ￿ > 0. (37)
33Formally, we ￿nd that @ ~ N=@￿ < 0; @~ xc=@￿ ￿ 0; and @~ xn=@￿ < 0: This can be established by noting that (i)
the only e⁄ect of ￿ on the equilibrium value of ~ N works through ￿, which is in turn increasing in ￿, and (ii) the
left-hand-side of equation (20) and ~ xn=~ xc are increasing in ￿(1 ￿ ￿), and thus decreasing in ￿.
34This result depends on the fact that the ￿rm does not make any relationship-speci￿c investments. Otherwise, a
greater share of surplus for the workers would distort the ￿rm￿ s investment incentives (see, for example, Hart and
Moore, 1990, Antr￿s, 2003, or Antr￿s and Helpman, 2004).
25This threshold is decreasing in ￿ (see Appendix A for details). This discussion leads to:
Proposition 7 Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then in the unique SSPE without ex ante
transfers, the equilibrium organizational form ￿ O satis￿es:
(i) ￿ O = C when ￿ + ￿ > 1.
(ii) If ￿ + ￿ < 1, then there exists a unique ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1) such that ￿ O = E for ￿E < ￿ ￿ and ￿ O = C
for ￿E > ￿ ￿. Furthermore, ￿ ￿ is decreasing in ￿.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. When there is a high degree of technological
complementarity (i.e., ￿ + ￿ < 1), the Shapley value of the ￿rm tends to be relatively low too. In
such cases, the ￿rm may be able to increase its pro￿ts (and its incentive to invest in the division
of labor) by hiring the agents as employees. In doing so, the ￿rm trades o⁄ a larger fraction of the
revenue for a smaller level of revenue (due to the reduced investment incentives of workers).
A similar logic explains the last statement in Proposition 7: other things equal, the region of the
parameter space in which the employment relationship emerges as an equilibrium outcome is larger
when there is greater complementarity between tasks (because, with greater complementarity, the
￿rm captures an even smaller fraction of sale revenues when dealing with outside contractors, it is
more likely to prefer ￿ O = E).
This result relates to, but is di⁄erent from, Marglin￿ s (1974) argument that the employment
relationship encourages the division of labor as a way of reducing the autonomy and bargaining
power of workers. Our result implies that the employment relationship itself emerges as a way
of reducing the bargaining power of the worker-suppliers, and this encourages further division of
labor.35
6 General Equilibrium
The theory of the division of labor that we have developed is simple enough to be used in various
applications, and in particular in applications that require general equilibrium interactions. We
illustrate a number of such applications in what follows. To save space, we limit the analysis to
the case with perfect credit markets, and we do not present the benchmark results with complete
contracts. Thus throughout the section we have 0 < ￿ < 1 and ￿ = 0. Under these circumstances
the ￿rm solves problem (19). Recall from Section 3 that equilibrium pro￿ts take the simple form
￿ = AZ (￿;￿)N
1+
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿ ￿ C (N) (see (25)), with Z (￿;￿) given by (26). We now exploit this
representation to embody our partial equilibrium model in a general equilibrium framework.
35This result is also related to Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Legros and Newman (2000), who develop property-
rights models of the ￿rm in which parties have a limited ability to transfer surplus ex-ante. An important distinction
between our approach and theirs stems from partial contractibility. In particular, the presence of partial contractibil-
ity implies that, even though vertical integration (the employment relationship) is a way of transferring resources
from worker-suppliers to the ￿rm, it emerges in equilibrium only when it is constrained-e¢ cient and increases the
equilibrium division of labor. This is di⁄erent from existing results in the literature, where credit constraints lead to
ine¢ cient integration decisions.
266.1 Basics
Assume that there exists a continuum of ￿nal goods q (j), with j 2 [0;Q], where Q represents








￿ cxe; 0 < ￿ < 1; (38)
where e is the total e⁄ort exerted by this individual as a worker,36 and the elasticity of substitution
between ￿nal goods, 1=(1 ￿ ￿), is greater than 1, so that ￿nal goods are gross substitutes in
consumption.
As is well known, these preferences imply the demand function q (z) =
￿
p(z)=pI￿￿1=(1￿￿) S=pI,





is the ideal price index, which we will take as numeraire, i.e., pI = 1. In other words, these prefer-
ences imply the demand function A(p(z))
￿1=(1￿￿) that we have used in the derivation of the pro￿t
function, where A = S.
We assume that ￿rms (sectors) di⁄er according to their technological complementarity, ￿, and
denote the cumulative distribution function of ￿ by H (￿) with support as a connected subset of
(0;1). This implies that if Q products are available for consumption, a fraction H (￿) of them are
produced with elasticities of substitution smaller than 1=(1 ￿ ￿).
The key general equilibrium interaction will come for competition between sectors (￿rms) for
scarce resources. Assume that there is one scarce input, labor, in ￿xed supply L that is used for
setting up and manning organizations. The wage rate in terms of real consumption is denoted by
w and is determined in general equilibrium with all other endogenous variables. More speci￿cally,
let us assume that
C (N) = wCL (N);
where CL (N) is the amount of labor needed to construct and operate a production facility with
the division of labor N. For example, if all that a ￿rm needs to do is to make sure that N agents
act as workers to perform the productive tasks, then CL (N) = N. But this function can be
highly nonlinear when other activities are needed to set up the organization of production. Clearly
Assumption 1 now applies to CL (N).
Using this notation, the ￿rst-order condition in the maximization of (25) for a ￿rm with sub-






L [N (￿;￿)]; for all ￿ 2 (0;1), (39)
where N (￿;￿) denotes the division of labor of the producer with complementarity given by ￿ when
a fraction ￿ of tasks are contractible.
36In particular, the cost of e⁄ort cx corresponds to the constant marginal rate of substitution between e⁄ort and
consumption.
27This equation shows that the key price that needs to adjust is w=A. It is convenient for what







L [N (￿;￿)]; for all ￿ 2 (0;1):
Although a is endogenous in general equilibrium, each ￿rm takes it as given. Proposition 2 implies
that ￿rms with higher elasticities of substitution choose ￿ner divisions of labor. Therefore this
equation implies a positive correlation between the degree of substitutability of tasks and the
division of labor in the cross-section of ￿rms.
Given each ￿rm￿ s desired level of division of labor, N (￿;￿), their demand for labor is CL([N (￿;￿)].




CL [N (￿;￿)]dH (￿) = L: (40)
The left-hand side describes the demand for labor while the right-hand side describes its supply.
This market clearing equation will generate the main general equilibrium results in this section.
Proposition 2 implies that N (￿;￿) is rising in ￿, so we may expect better contracting institutions
to increase the division of labor for all producers. But the resource constraint, (40), implies that
not all N (￿;￿)s can increase simultaneously. Consequently, the endogenous variable, a, has to
adjust to clear the market. We now examine the implications of the competition for labor using
three alternative models.38
6.2 Exogenous Number of Products
In this example we assume that the number of products, Q, is given, and that every product is
produced by a di⁄erent ￿rm. The labor market clearing condition is given by (40). Since the division
of labor is increasing in the extent of the market a and the cost function CL (N) is increasing in N,
the demand for labor, i.e., the left-hand side of (40), is an increasing function of a, and (40) yields
a unique solution for a. Using this value of a in (39) then determines the cross-sectional variation
in the division of labor.
To illustrate general equilibrium interactions, and in particular, the implications of di⁄erences
in contracting institutions, compare two countries that are identical, except for their ￿s. Di⁄eren-
tiating the ￿rst-order condition (39) yields
^ a + ￿￿ (￿;￿) ^ ￿ = ￿[N (￿;￿)] ^ N (￿;￿); (41)
where ^ y represents the proportional rate of change of variable y, ￿￿ (￿;￿) is the elasticity of
37More formally, (40) should hold with complementary slackness together with w ￿ 0, but it is straightforward to
see that the wage will always be positive.
38We have also worked out an endogenous growth model with expanding product variety, in which new entrants
draw an ￿ from a known distribution. In this model, the long-run rate of growth depends on the degree of contract
incompleteness. We do not discuss this model in order to save space.
28Z (￿;￿) with respect to ￿ and ￿(N) is the elasticity of the marginal cost curve C0
L (N) minus





￿ (￿ + 1) ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
:
Assumption 1 implies that ￿(N) > 0. Moreover, we show in the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix
A that ￿￿ (￿;￿) > 0 and ￿￿ (￿;￿) is declining in ￿.
Obtaining the relationship between ￿ and a is straightforward. Di⁄erentiating (40) yields
Z 1
0
￿L (￿) ^ N (￿;￿)dH (￿) = 0, (42)
where ￿L (￿) = C0
L [N (￿;￿)]N (￿;￿). Substituting (41) into (42) gives a simple relationship be-
tween ￿ and a,
^ a = ￿
R 1
0 ￿L (￿)￿￿ (￿;￿)￿[N (￿;￿)]
￿1 dH (￿)
R 1
0 ￿L (￿)￿[N (￿;￿)]
￿1 dH (￿)
^ ￿;
establishing that a is declining in ￿. In other words, when contracting institutions improve, wages
increase relative to expenditure and a will decline.
Equation (42) also shows that ^ N (￿;￿) (in response to ^ ￿) can only be positive for some ￿s and
has to be negative for others, because the resource constraint implies that not all ￿rms can improve
their division of labor. The question is therefore whether the division of labor improves in high or
low ￿ ￿rms. The answer is clear from (41): since the left-hand side is decreasing in ￿, it is negative
for high ￿￿ s and positive for low ￿￿ s. Therefore, the division of labor improves in ￿rms that are
more contract dependent, i.e., low ￿ ￿rms, and worsens in ￿rms that are less contract dependent,
i.e., high ￿ ￿rms. This is a re￿ ection of the negative cross partial @￿￿ (￿;￿)=@￿. More precisely,
there exists a critical value ￿￿ such that ^ N (￿;￿) > 0 for all ￿ < ￿￿ and ^ N (￿;￿) < 0 for all
￿ > ￿￿.
We summarize this result as:
Proposition 8 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists ￿￿ 2 (0;1) such that in the general
equilibrium economy with Q constant, an increase in ￿ raises the division of labor N (￿;￿) in all
￿rms with ￿ < ￿￿ and reduces it in all ￿rms with ￿ > ￿￿.
6.3 Comparative Advantage
We now extend the analysis to a world with two trading countries, indexed by ‘ = 1;2, to derive
implications for comparative advantage as a function of contracting institutions.39 We continue to
assume that there are ￿xed numbers of products, and every product is distinct not only from other
products produced in its own country but also from products produced in the foreign country. All
products can be freely traded between the two countries.
39The link between contracting institutions and endogenous comparative advantage was previously discussed by
Levchenko (2003), Costinot (2004), Nunn (2004) and Antr￿s (2005).
29We focus on the impact of contract incompleteness on comparative advantage. For this purpose
suppose that the two countries are identical, in particular, L1 = L2, Q1 = Q2 and H1 (￿) = H2 (￿)
for all ￿ 2 (0;1), but the fraction of activities ￿‘ that are contractible di⁄ers across countries.
Without loss of generality, we assume that ￿1 > ￿2, so that country 1 has better contracting
institutions.
The equilibrium condition for the division of labor, (39), holds in both countries, with di⁄erent
wage rates, w‘, for the two countries (A is the same for both countries and equal to world expen-


















; for all ￿ 2 (0;1): (43)
In addition, the labor market clearing condition, (40), holds in both countries. This immediately
implies that the country with better contracting institutions, i.e., country 1, has higher wages, thus
lower a‘.40
The pattern of trade can now be determined by comparing the revenues of ￿rms with the same
value of ￿ (technological complementarity) in the two countries. Appendix A (see the proof of
Proposition 2) shows that revenue of a producer with elasticity ￿ in country ‘ is given by:41











1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿‘) ￿
￿+￿
i: (44)
Revenues are increasing in total world expenditure, A, in Z (￿;￿), in the division of labor, but also
include an additional correction which is the last term.42
If R1 (￿)=R2 (￿) >
R 1
0 R1 (￿)dH (￿)=
R 1
0 R2 (￿)dH (￿), then country 1 is a net exporter of
goods with substitution parameter ￿. Consequently, we simply need to determine the distribution
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1 ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿ ￿
￿+￿
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1) ￿
￿+￿
: (45)
Proposition 8 implies that there exists an ￿￿ such that N1 (￿) < N2 (￿) for all ￿ > ￿￿
and N1 (￿) > N2 (￿) for all ￿ < ￿￿. As a result, country 1, which has the better contract-







). Nevertheless, when the elasticity of marginal cost C0
L (N) is not constant,
country 1 may also export some high-￿ products. On the other hand, when ￿(N) is a constant,
^ N (￿;￿) decreases further with ￿ when ￿ is higher (because the cross partial @￿￿ (￿;￿)=@￿ is neg-
ative). This implies that R1 (￿)=R2 (￿) is declining with ￿ in equation (45). Consequently, there
40Suppose not, then from (43), N
1 (￿) > N
2 (￿) for all ￿ (since N (￿) is increasing in ￿ for given a), and this would
violate market clearing.
41Firms use their revenue to pay for labor costs and compensation of worker-suppliers, with the rest being pro￿ts.
42This last term does not appear in the pro￿t function, since it corresponds to the part of the revenue paid out to
workers to compensate for their e⁄ort.
30exists ￿ ￿￿ 2 (0;1) such that R1 (￿)=R2 (￿) >
R 1
0 R1 (￿)dH (￿)=
R 1
0 R2 (￿)dH (￿) for all ￿ < ￿ ￿￿ and
the opposite inequality holding for all ￿ > ￿ ￿￿. In this event country 1, with the better contracting
institutions, is a net exporter in low ￿ sectors and a net importer in high ￿ sectors. This result is
summarized in the next proposition:
Proposition 9 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and ￿(N) is constant. Then there exists ￿ ￿￿ 2 (0;1)
such that in the two-country world equilibrium, country 1 with ￿1 > ￿2 is a net exporter of the
products with ￿ < ￿ ￿￿ and a net importer of products with ￿ > ￿ ￿￿.
The implication of this result is that di⁄erences in contracting institutions have created endoge-
nous comparative advantage for the country with better contracting institutions towards sectors
that are more ￿contract dependent,￿which, in this case, are those with greater technological com-
plementarity.
6.4 Free Entry
We have so far assumed that the number of products Q is ￿xed in every country. Another source
of general equilibrium interactions comes from endogenizing Q through a free entry condition. To
brie￿ y discuss these issues, suppose that there is free entry into the production of ￿nal goods and
the number of products is endogenously determined. In particular, suppose that an entrant faces
a ￿xed cost of entry wf, where f is the amount of labor required for entry. This cost is born in
addition to the cost of division of labor. Moreover, in the spirit of Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz
(2003), assume that an entrant does not know a key parameter of the technology prior to entry.
While in their models the entrant does not know its productivity, we assume instead that it does
not know ￿ (but knows that ￿ is drawn from the cumulative distribution function H (￿)). Since
the relationship between ￿ and productivity is determined in general equilibrium, the distribution
of productivity levels is endogenous.
After entry a ￿rm learns its ￿ and maximizes the pro￿t function (25). This leads to the ￿rst-
order condition (39), which determines the division of labor as a function of the extent of the market
a, the degree of contract incompleteness ￿ and its ￿. Let us de￿ne
￿(￿;￿;a) = aZ (￿;￿)N (￿;￿)
1+
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿ ￿ CL [N (￿;￿)];
with Z (￿;￿) given by (26), and N (￿;￿) as the pro￿t-maximizing choice of division of labor (which
we do not condition on a to simplify notation as before). In other words, ￿(￿;￿;a) is the indi-
rect pro￿t function, with pro￿ts measured in units of labor. ￿(￿;￿;a) is increasing in all three
arguments.
Free entry implies that expected pro￿ts must equal the entry cost wf,
Z 1
0
￿(￿;￿;a)dH (￿) = f: (46)
31Since the expected pro￿ts are increasing in the adjusted extent of the market, a, this free entry
condition uniquely determines the equilibrium a (i.e., without reference to the labor market clearing
condition, (40))
Now, given the equilibrium value of a, the ￿rst-order condition (39) determines the cross-
sectional variation in the division of labor. Firms with larger ￿s choose a ￿ner division of labor and
they are more productive. Consequently, the distribution of ￿ induces a distribution of productivity
and ￿rm size.43
Finally, we can use the labor market clearing condition to determine the number of entrants.
Since labor is now used to cover both the costs for entry and the division of labor, the market




CL([N (￿;￿)]dH (￿) + f
￿
= L:
Using the values of N (￿;￿) that were determined by (39) and (46), we can use this modi￿ed labor
market clearing condition to solve for the number of entrants Q.44
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a tractable framework for the analysis of the impact of the degree of
contract incompleteness (or more generally contracting institutions) and technological complemen-
tarities on the equilibrium division of labor. In our model, a ￿rm decides the division of labor and
contracts with a set of worker-suppliers on a subset of activities they have to perform. Investments
in the remaining activities are noncontractible, so workers choose them anticipating the ex post
bargaining equilibrium.
We model the ex post bargaining problem using the Shapley value and provide a characterization
of the division of surplus. Using this characterization, we show that greater contract incompleteness
reduces both the division of labor and the equilibrium level of productivity given the division of
labor. The impact of contract incompleteness is greater when there is greater complementarities
between the tasks performed by di⁄erent workers. Similar result hold when credit markets are
imperfect, so that ex ante transfers are not possible. Interestingly, however, imperfect credit markets
may increase (measured) productivity, because the ￿rm may force its workers to overinvest in
contractible activities in order to extract the surplus they capture in the bargaining game. We
also show how the ￿rm may want to hire worker-suppliers as employees in order to change the
bargaining game, and how this interacts with the equilibrium division of labor.
43The degree of dispersion of productivity depends on the degree of contract incompleteness. In particular, in
countries with better contracting institutions there will be less productivity and size dispersion.
44Another interesting implication of this analysis is that the overall supply of labor L is not a source of comparative
advantage. If two countries that di⁄er only in L freely trade with each other, their wages are equalized, their division
of labor is the same in every industry ￿, and they have the same distribution of productivity and ￿rm size. The only
di⁄erence is that the larger country has proportionately more ￿nal good producers. This contrasts with the case with
exogenous number of products, where di⁄erences in L would generate comparative advantage.
32Finally, in the last section, we embody the partial equilibrium model in a series of general
equilibrium setups and derive implications for the cross-sectional distribution of division of labor
and the impact of contracting institutions on comparative advantage. The most interesting result
here is that societies with better contracting institutions have comparative advantage in sectors
with greater technological complementarities (which are the more ￿contract-dependent￿ sectors,
since contractual problems create more ine¢ ciency in those sectors).
The analysis of general equilibrium is tractable thanks to the reduced-form (equilibrium) pro￿t
function derived in partial equilibrium, where the degree of contract incompleteness and technolog-
ical complementarities a⁄ect a single derived parameter. This property makes it relatively simple
to use our framework in various applications.
A number of areas are left for future research. These include, but are not limited to, the
following:
￿ It would be interesting to derive the implications of this model for the relationship between
(contracting) institutions and productivity across countries. This would be an important area
for future research partly because, despite increasing evidence that di⁄erences in (total factor)
productivity are an important element of cross-country di⁄erences in income per capita, we are
far from a theory of productivity di⁄erences. Our model leads to both endogenous di⁄erences
in the ￿technology￿of production (as measured by the division of labor) and in the e¢ ciency
with which a given technology is used.
￿ The model assumes that all activities are symmetric. An important extension is to see whether
similar results hold with a more general production function, where the ￿rm may wish to treat
some workers/tasks di⁄erently than others, for example, depending on how essential they are
for production.
￿ Another area for future study is a more systematic investigation (beyond what we have
presented in Appendix B) of the joint determination of the range of tasks and the number
of workers performing these tasks. Such an analysis would enable us to incorporate both the
forces analyzed in this paper and those emphasized by Marglin (1974) in a single framework.
￿ Finally, it is important to investigate whether the relationship between contracting institu-
tions, technological complementarities and the division of labor is fundamentally di⁄erent
when we use di⁄erent approaches to the theory of the ￿rm, for example, as in the work by
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
33Appendix A: Proofs of the Main Results
Second-Order Conditions in the Complete-Contracting Case
Let ￿ = A1￿￿N￿(￿+1)x￿ ￿ cxNx ￿ C (N). Using the ￿rst-order conditions (6) and (7), the matrix of the









￿1 ￿cx [1 ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)]
￿cx [1 ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)] ￿N￿1 [1 ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)](￿ + 1)￿￿1C0 ￿ C00
!
:
The second-order conditions are satis￿ed if this matrix is negative de￿nite, which requires its diagonal
elements to be negative and its determinant to be positive. The ￿rst diagonal element is negative, the
second diagonal element is negative if and only if
C00N
C0 >
[￿ (1 + ￿) ￿ 1](￿ + 1)
￿
;
and the determinant is positive if and only if
C00N
C0 >
￿ (1 + ￿) ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
:
Note that if ￿ (1 + ￿) < 1 both these conditions are satis￿ed, and if ￿ (1 + ￿) ￿ 1 the second inequality implies
the ￿rst inequality. Therefore Assumption 1 is necessary and su¢ cient for the second-order conditions to be
satis￿ed.
Proof of Proposition 1
The ￿rst part of the proposition is a direct implication of Assumption 1. The comparative statics of N￿ follow
from the implicit function theorem by noting that, except for ￿, N￿ increases in response to an increase in
a parameter if and only if this parameter raises the left-hand side of (6). Using the results concerning the
response of N￿ to changes in parameters together with (7) then implies the responses of x￿ to parameter
changes.
Proof of Lemma 1 and Related Results
Let there be M workers each one controlling a range " = N=M of the continuum of tasks. Due to symmetry,
all workers provide an amount xc of contractible activities. As for the noncontractible activities, consider
a situation in which a worker j supplies an amount xn (j) per non-contractible activity, while the M ￿ 1
remaining workers supply the same amount xn (￿j) (note that we are again appealing to symmetry).
To compute the Shapley value for this particular worker j, we need to determine the marginal contribution
of this worker to a given coalition of agents. A coalition of n workers and the ￿rm yields a sale revenue of
FIN (n;N;") = A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿)x￿￿
c
h
(n ￿ 1)"xn (￿j)




when the worker j is in the coalition, and a sale revenue







34when worker j is not in the coalition. Notice that even when n < N, the term N￿(￿+1￿1=￿) remains in front,
because it represents a feature of the technology, though productivity su⁄ers because the term in square
brackets is lower.





























= 0, because in this event the ￿rm is necessarily ordered after j. If g (j) = 1 then the ￿rm

















, given g (j) = 1, is 1







MFOUT (0;N;"). Repeating the same argument for g (j) = i, i > 1, the conditional ex-





, given g (j) = i, is i



















i"[FIN (i;N;") ￿ FOUT (i ￿ 1;N;")]":





























































Now taking the limit as M ! 1, and therefore " = N=M ! 0, the sum on the right hand side of this



















35Solving the integral delivers
lim
M!1








with ￿ = ￿=(￿ + ￿). This corresponds to equation (14) in the main text, and completes the proof of the
lemma.
In addition, imposing symmetry, i.e., xn (j) = xn (￿j), the ￿rm￿ s payo⁄ is
s0 = A1￿￿N￿(￿+1)x￿￿
c xn
￿(1￿￿) ￿ Nsj = ￿A1￿￿x￿￿
c x￿(1￿￿)
n N￿(￿+1),
as stated in equation (17) in the text.
We can also compute the marginal contribution of a worker to a coalition of size n when the technology
choice is N. Imposing symmetry, i.e., xn (j) = xn (￿j), if the worker controls a range " of tasks, her marginal
contribution is:





































where R = A1￿￿N￿(￿+1)x￿￿
c x
￿(1￿￿)
n . As stated in the main text, this marginal contribution is increasing in
￿ when n=N < exp(￿￿=￿) and decreasing in ￿ for n=N > exp(￿￿=￿).
Proof of Proposition 2
First, we verify that the second-order conditions are again satis￿ed under Assumption 1. To see this, note
that the problem in (9) is convex and delivers a unique xn = ￿ xn (N;xc), as given in (18). Plugging this












￿1 ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
i￿(1￿￿)=[1￿￿(1￿￿)]
[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)].
The second-order conditions can be checked, analogously to the case with complete contracts, by computing
the Jacobian and checking that it is negative de￿nite. We present here an alternative proof which also serves
to illustrate how the reduced-form pro￿t function (25) in the main text is derived. In particular, notice that


























1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
,
as in equation (26) in the text. This reduced-form expression of the pro￿t function immediately implies that




1￿￿ ￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿), which combined with (15) and (24) implies that the ￿rm￿ s revenues
are:






@ 1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)
h





which will be used in Section 6 (see equation (44)).
Next, the comparative static results follow from the implicit function theorem as in the proof of Propo-
sition 1. First, @ ~ N=@A > 0 follows immediately. To show that @ ~ N=@￿ > 0 and @ ~ N=@￿ > 0, let us take
logarithms of both sides of (20), to obtain
￿ (￿ + 1) ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿





















1 ￿ #(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
+











(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ #)
(1 ￿ ￿)#(1 ￿ #(1 ￿ ￿))
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(1 ￿ #(1 ￿ ￿))
2 (1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))(1 ￿ ￿)
< 0.
Thus, @F (#;￿)=@￿ reaches its minimum over the set ￿ 2 [0;1] at ￿ = 1, in which case it equals
# ￿ ￿ + ￿ ln(￿=#)
1 ￿ ￿
> 0;
where the inequality follows from # ￿ ￿ + ￿ ln(￿=#) being decreasing in # for # < ￿, and equalling 0 at
# = ￿. We thus have shown that @F (#;￿)=@￿ > 0 for all ￿, so that @ ~ N=@￿ > 0.





(1 ￿ #(1 ￿ ￿))
2 #(1 ￿ ￿)
< 0,
37which implies @2 ~ N=@￿@￿ < 0.
Incidentally, note that @F (#;￿)=@￿ > 0 and @2 ~ N=@￿@￿ < 0 imply that the elasticity ￿￿ (￿;￿) de￿ned
in equation (41) is both positive and decreasing in ￿.
Next, note that straightforward di⁄erentiation of (24) delivers @ (~ xn=~ xc)=@A = 0, @ (~ xn=~ xc)=@￿ > 0
and @ (~ xn=~ xc)=@￿ > 0. And, in light of equation (21), the e⁄ects of A, ￿ and ￿ on ~ xc follow directly from
those on ~ N, where the inequalities becomes strict whenever C00 (￿) > 0.
Finally, given that ~ xc and ~ xn are nondecreasing in A, ￿ and ￿, and given that ~ N is increasing in these
parameters, it follows that productivity ~ P is also necessarily increasing in these parameters.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof follows from Proposition 2, since
n
~ N; ~ xc; ~ P
o
converge to fN￿;x￿;P￿g as ￿ ! 1, and ~ N; ~ xc; ~ xc,
and ~ P are all increasing in ￿ (nondecreasing in ￿, in the case of the investment levels).
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2. First, it is straightforward to establish that Assumption
1 ensures that the second-order conditions are met. This is easily veri￿ed by noting that equation (31)
implicitly de￿nes a reduced-form pro￿t function analogous to that in (25), with the same exponent on N.
As in previous proofs, to show that @ ￿ N=@A > 0, @ ￿ N=@￿ > 0, and @ ￿ N=@￿ > 0 we need only show that
the left-hand side of (32) is increasing in these three parameters. This is evident for the case of the size of
the market A. For the other two parameters, let us take logarithms of both sides of (32), to obtain
￿ (￿ + 1) ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿





































￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿






(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
2 ￿
< 0.
Thus, @G(￿;￿)=@￿ reaches its minimum over the set ￿ 2 [0;1] at ￿ = 1, in which case it equals 0. From
this we can conclude that for ￿ < 1, @G(￿;￿)=@￿ > 0 and thus @ ￿ N=@￿ > 0. Notice also that the cross
partial derivative above also implies @2 ￿ N=@￿@￿ < 0.









@ ln(1 ￿ ￿)
@￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿












(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))(1 ￿ ￿)
:
When 1￿￿￿￿ > 0 this expression is positive, because ￿ increases in ￿. Next consider the case 1￿￿￿￿ < 0.
38Assumption 3 implies
1 ￿ ￿ > 1 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)






















(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
:






The last inequality follows since ￿(1 ￿ ￿) = ￿￿=(￿ + ￿) is increasing in ￿, proving that @G(￿;￿)=@￿ > 0
and thus @ ￿ N=@￿ > 0.
Let us next turn to the comparative statics related to the investment levels. First, note that di⁄erentiation
of (30) delivers @ (￿ xn=￿ xc)=@A = 0, @ (￿ xn=￿ xc)=@￿ > 0 and @ (￿ xn=￿ xc)=@￿ > 0. Next, in light of equation (34),
the e⁄ects of ￿ on ￿ xn follow directly from those on ￿ N (since ￿ is independent of ￿). On the other hand, ￿ xn
is nondecreasing in ￿ provided that @ ￿ N=@￿ > 0 (shown above) and that ￿(1 ￿ ￿)=￿￿ is nondecreasing in
￿. The latter is clearly the case when ￿ = ￿=(￿ + ￿), in which case ￿(1 ￿ ￿)=￿￿ = 1. Lemma 3 states that
this is also true for the general de￿nition of ￿ in section 5.
Finally, consider the comparative statics related to productivity. The positive e⁄ect of A on ￿ P follows
directly from noting that ￿ xc and ￿ xn are nondecreasing in A, while ￿ N is increasing in A. For the e⁄ect of ￿
on productivity note that, using (32), ￿ P = ￿ N￿￿ x￿
c ￿ x1￿￿











which depends on ￿ only through the term C0 ￿ ￿ N
￿ ￿ N1￿￿, thus establishing @ ￿ P=@￿ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider ￿rst the inequality 1 > ~ xn=~ xc > ￿ xn=￿ xc. The ￿rst inequality is a direct implication of Proposition
3. As for the second inequality, straightforward manipulation of (24) and (30) indicates that ~ xn=~ xc > ￿ xn=￿ xc
provided that Assumption 3 holds.
Next, we note that the inequality N￿ > ~ N was established in Proposition 3. Thus we only show that
~ N > ￿ N. Using equations (20) and (32), and the arguments in previous propositions, it should be clear that
























Taking logarithms on both sides of the inequality, and after some manipulation, we can write this condition
39as
H (￿) ￿ ln
￿














(1￿￿) ￿ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿





￿(1 ￿ ￿)((1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(￿=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿ + ￿) + ￿￿))






(1￿￿) ￿ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
!






1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿





(1 ￿ ￿)((1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(￿=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿ + ￿) + ￿￿))
(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))￿￿
> 0.
The fact that   is positive is implied by Assumption 3. Notice also that
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
(1 +  ) =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
￿ (1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))
< 1,
(where the inequality follows from ￿ > ￿(1 ￿ ￿)), which implies (24) in the text.
We next use the fact that b  ￿ ln(1 +  ) is decreasing in   whenever b(1 +  ) < 1, to conclude that
H0 (￿) < 0
whenever Assumption 3 holds. But note that Assumption 3 places an upper bound on ￿, and thus H (￿)
reaches its minimum at this upper bound, in which case it equals 0. Mathematically, we have that
H (￿) > H ((1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)=(￿=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿ + ￿) + ￿￿)) = 0,
which completes the proof that ~ N > ￿ N.
To obtain the ranking of productivity levels, combine (21), (22), (33), (34), and the de￿nitions of ~ P and


























and C0 ￿ ￿ N
￿










(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))




Part (i) of the proposition then simply follows from ￿ N < ~ N (as shown above) and the fact that, under
Assumption 3, the second term in brackets is greater than one.
For part (ii) of the proposition, let us ￿rst show that ￿ P=P￿ is increasing in ￿. Following a similar
40procedure as in the case of ￿ P= ~ P ￿but this time using (6) and (7) ￿we obtain:
￿ P
P￿ =












Notice that this ratio is necessarily increasing in ￿ because @ ￿ N=@￿ > 0, C00 ￿ ￿ N
￿
￿ 0, and the last term is











￿(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)
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1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿




Next note that when ￿ ! 0, this ratio goes to
￿ P
P￿ =






(1 ￿ ￿) < 1,
where the inequality follows from ￿ N < N￿.
Next, plugging (6) and (32) to eliminate the terms C0 (N￿) and C0 ￿ ￿ N
￿
































Notice ￿nally that when ￿ ￿ 1￿￿ then
￿ ￿ N=N￿￿ ￿
1￿￿ ￿1
￿ 1, which combined with ￿ < 1￿￿ implies ￿ P > P￿.
This establishes that provided that ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ and ￿ < 1 ￿ ￿, there exists a unique ￿ 2 (0;1), such that if
￿ < ￿, then ￿ P < P￿, but if ￿ > ￿, then ￿ P > P￿.
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1. A coalition of n workers and the ￿rm yields a sale revenue of
FIN (n;N;") = A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿)x￿￿
c
h
(n ￿ 1)"xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿ + "xn (j)






41when the worker j is in the coalition, and a sale revenue











when worker j is not in the coalition.






i"[FIN (i;N;") ￿ FOUT (i ￿ 1;N;")]":























































































Finally, integrating by parts delivers
lim
M!1















(￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿
￿)
,
as claimed in the Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3
Let













42>From inspection of (A8), in order to prove that @￿=@￿ > 0 it is su¢ cient to show that





x ￿ x(ln￿) ￿ 1)￿
x
￿ (1 ￿ ￿
x)
2 ￿ 0 (A9)
for all x 2 (0;2) and ￿ 2 [0;1). But this inequality follows from the fact that ￿
x ￿ x(ln￿) ￿ 1 is decreasing
in ￿ for x 2 (0;2) and ￿ 2 [0;1), and equals zero when ￿ ! 1. Hence, for ￿ 2 [0;1), @￿=@￿ > 0 and thus
@￿=@￿ > 0. Notice in addition that using l￿ H￿pital rule, it is easily veri￿ed that lim￿!1 ￿ = 1.











while (A9) implies @2￿=@￿@￿ ￿ 0. We thus need only show that @￿=@￿ ￿ 0 when ￿ = 1. We establish this













from which it follows that @￿=@￿ = 0 when ￿ = 1. This implies that for ￿ 2 [0;1), @￿=@￿ < 0 and thus
@￿=@￿ < 0.



































It su¢ ces to show that @2￿=@￿@￿ is positive, because in such case @￿=@￿ would reach its minimum over
the set ￿ 2 [0;1] at ￿ = 0, in which case @￿=@￿ equals 0. We thus need only show that
g (x) = ￿
2x ￿ 2￿





x + 1 > 0
for all 0 < x ￿ 2. Given that g (0) = 0, we prove this by showing that g0 (x) > 0 for x > 0. In particular,








which is positive because h(x) = (1 + x(ln￿))
2 + 1 ￿ 2￿
x is increasing in x and equals 0 at x = 0. To see
that h0 (x) > 0 note that
h0 (x) = 2ln(￿)(xln(￿) ￿ ￿
x + 1),
and we showed above that 1 + x(ln￿) ￿ ￿
x < 0. This completes the proof that @￿=@￿ > 0.



























43is nonnegative. But this follows from the fact that ￿
x￿(ln￿)x￿1 > 0 for all ￿ 2 [0;1), which was established
above.
Because ￿￿ is increasing in ￿, it should be clear that, from ￿(1 ￿ ￿)=￿￿ being nondecreasing in ￿, we
can conclude that ￿(1 ￿ ￿) is increasing in ￿. This completes the proof of the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 7
That ￿ O = C when ￿+￿ ￿ 1 has been proved in the main text. We thus focus on the case ￿+￿ < 1. In such
case, the employment relationship dominates outside contracting only if ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿=(1￿￿) is higher under an







(￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿
￿)
,
(where clearly ￿ = g (￿)), this condition can be written as
g (￿E)[1 ￿ g (￿E)]
￿











Notice that the left-hand side of this inequality is equal to the right-hand side whenever ￿E = 0, and it
equals 0 when ￿E ! 1 (see the proof of Lemma 3). Furthermore, straightforward di⁄erentiation indicates
that the left-hand side of the inequality is increasing in ￿E when g (￿E) < 1 ￿ ￿ and decreasing in ￿E when
g (￿E) > 1 ￿ ￿. Coupled with the fact that g0 (￿E) > 0, this implies that g (￿E)[1 ￿ g (￿E)]
￿
1￿￿ is strictly
concave in ￿E and attains a unique maximum in the set ￿E 2 [0;1].
Importantly, when ￿ + ￿ < 1 then g (0) < 1 ￿ ￿, and thus for su¢ ciently small ￿E, the left-hand side of
(A10) is necessarily increasing in ￿E. This implies that the above inequality (A10) will hold for su¢ ciently
small values of ￿E making an employment relationship optimal (i.e., ￿ O = E). In such case, and given that
lim￿E!1 g (￿E) = 1, there exists a unique ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1) such that, for ￿E > ￿ ￿, the above inequality is reversed
and outside contracting becomes optimal again (i.e., ￿ O = C).





































necessarily decreasing in ￿ since, at ￿, the function g (￿)[1 ￿ g (￿)]
￿




























￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿(￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
=
 




















￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿(￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
.













and thus @￿=@￿ < 0.
44Appendix B: The Division of Labor and the Scope of Firms
This Appendix analyzes the simultaneous choice of division of labor and scope of ￿rms, i.e., M and N, using
the production function (2) under complete and incomplete contracts. Recall that in this case production
requires the combination of N tasks and these tasks are divided equally among M workers (so that each
performs " = N=M tasks). We assume, in addition to the assumptions in the main text, that each worker
has to incur a cost ￿(N=M), where ￿ is a nonnegative, increasing and convex function, with ￿(0) = 0 and
limM!1 M￿(N=M) = 0. This cost captures ￿diseconomies of scope￿at the individual level, and implies
that it is more costly for a worker to deal with more tasks, for example, because it requires greater e⁄ort or
training. The last requirement implies that these economies of this scope are su¢ ciently powerful.
Now an argument similar to that in the text implies that, with complete contracts, the pro￿t maximiza-































Given this formulation, limM!1 M￿(N=M) = 0 implies that the maximum of this program will be reached
as M ! 1.45 In other words, su¢ cient diseconomies of scope leads to maximum division of labor under
complete contracts. It is also straightforward to see that the rest of the analysis applies in this case.
We next turn to study the choice of division of labor under incomplete contracts. Here M in￿ uences ex
post bargaining and through this channel has a direct e⁄ect on the investments xn. Consequently, the pro￿t-
maximizing choice of M will not simply minimize M￿(N=M). In fact, in the absence of credit constraints
and the cost ￿(N=M), M would be chosen to maximize workers￿investment in noncontractible activities as
a function of M, ￿ xn (xc;M). This is equivalent to maximizing the ex post bargaining power of workers.
To illustrate how these considerations shape the choice of M, we now compute the Shapley value when
there are a ￿nite number of workers equal to M. Suppose that each worker invests xc in contractible
activities. As for the noncontractible activities, consider a situation in which a worker j supplies an amount
xn (j) per non-contractible activity, while the M ￿ 1 remaining workers supply the same amount xn (￿j).
To compute the Shapley value for this particular worker j, we need to determine the marginal contribution
of this worker to a given coalition of agents. A coalition of n workers and the ￿rm generates a revenue of














when the worker j is in the coalition, and a sale revenue










when worker j is not in the coalition.
45To see this, it su¢ ces that the solution to this problem will be symmetric with x(i;j) = x for all i;j, and this
implies that the only dependence on M comes from the last term. The assumption that limM!1 M￿(N=M) = 0
implies that this term is minimized as M ! 1.






















i[FIN (i;M) ￿ FOUT (i ￿ 1;M)]:










































where, as in the main text, R = A1￿￿N￿(￿+1)x￿￿
c x
(1￿￿)￿















The function ￿(￿) describes the fraction of the revenue allocated to all the workers combined. It rises with
￿=￿, i.e., it declines with ￿, because (i ￿ 1)=M in the sum is smaller than 1. The residual fraction, 1￿￿(￿),
goes to the ￿rm. It follows that the e⁄ect of ￿ on these fractions is the same as in the main text. Notice
























= 1 ￿ ￿,
where ￿ is as de￿ned in equation (15) in the main text.
Now consider the impact of M and xc on investment in noncontractible activities. worker j seeks to
maximize sj ￿cx
N
M (1 ￿ ￿)xn (j). Using (B3), the ￿rst-order condition, evaluated at xn (￿j) = xn (j) = xn,
is:






















replaces ￿=(￿ + ￿).
Evidently, here too investment is rising in ￿ (because the i=M terms in the sum are smaller than 1). So we
obtain once again that investments in noncontractible activities are increasing in ￿ and the share accruing







! ￿=(￿ + ￿) as M goes
to in￿nity.
46As argued above, ignoring the e⁄ect of M on the ￿xed costs associated with the diseconomies of scope,











The following lemma characterizes the properties of this function:
Lemma 4 The function S (M) is monotonic in M. In particular, it is increasing in M for ￿=￿ < 1 and
decreasing in M for ￿=￿ > 1. Furthermore, S (1) = 1=2 and limM!1 S (M) = ￿=(￿ + ￿).
Proof. The two last claims were shown above, so we focus here on proving the monotonicity of S (M). First
note, that S (M) > S (1) = 1=2 for ￿=￿ < 1 and S (M) < S (1) = 1=2 for ￿=￿ > 1 whenever M ￿ 2. In the






















for M ￿ 2:
Next note that using
S (M + 1) =
1




















Combining this expression with the inequality S (M) > 1=2 for ￿=￿ < 1, we can establish that for
￿=￿ < 1,





















which establishes that S (M) is monotonically increasing whenever ￿=￿ < 1.
The case with ￿=￿ > 1 can be analyzed similarly. Using S (M) < 1=2, we can establish that





















and hence S (M) is monotonically decreasing from 1=2 to ￿=(￿ + ￿).
Consider the implications for this Lemma for the pro￿t-maximizing choice of M. First, this Lemma
implies that as long as ￿ < ￿, even in the absence of diseconomies of scope, i.e., for ￿(N=M) ￿ 0, the ￿rm
47prefers M ! 1, because this choice maximizes the ex post bargaining power of workers and therefore their
investments. The presence of diseconomies of scope only reinforces this e⁄ect. This implies:
Proposition 10 Suppose that there are incomplete contracts and no credit constraints, and that ￿ < ￿.
Then for all nonnegative, increasing and convex cost functions ￿(N=M) that satisfy limM!1 M￿(N=M) =
0, the pro￿t-maximizing choice of the ￿rm is M ! 1.
This result justi￿es our focus in the text on the case where the range of tasks and the division of labor are
treated the same (i.e., N is equated with the division of labor). Moreover, given M ! 1, the equilibrium
derived in the text applies exactly.
The assumption limM!1 M￿(N=M) = 0 in this proposition can be relaxed to limM!1 M￿(N=M) ￿
M0￿(N=M0) for all M0 ￿ 1. Essentially, the results requires that there are no ￿economies of scope￿and
that the function M￿(N=M) does not have an interior strict minimum for some M0 ￿ 1. This assumption
is satis￿ed, for example, when ￿(x) = 0 for all x.
In contrast, when ￿ > ￿, the choice of M will result from a trade-o⁄ between minimizing diseconomies
of scope (which dictates M ! 1) and maximizing ex ante incentives to invest in xn (which dictates M = 1).
The exact equilibrium in this case will depend on the shape of the ￿ function. When ￿ > ￿ our analysis in
the main text (which imposes M ! 1) can be justi￿ed by assuming that the e⁄ect of the diseconomies of
scope is large enough to dominate the outcome. Mathematically, this corresponds to assuming that ￿(N=M)
is rising su¢ ciently fast.
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